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TENANT REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
HABITABILITY: TORT DIMENSIONS OF A
CONTRACT CONCEPT
James Charles Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern conception of the landlord-tenant relationship is that
of a hybrid, with a lease being both a conveyance and a contract.
This view has been accepted by the large majority of courts and com-
mentators in recent years,' as well as by the Restatement (Second) of
the Law of Property' and the Uniform Residential Landlord and
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1974, St. Olaf College; J.D.
1977, University of Texas. I am indebted to Professors Tom Eaton and Dick Wellman for
many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and to Wade Tomlinson for his
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., 3A A. CORBIN, CONTACrs § 686, at 236 (rev. ed. 1960); 3 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890, at 580-81 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1968); Glendon, The
Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 503, 505-12 (1982);
Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and
Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1213 (1983). These authors agree that a lease is
both a conveyance and a contract. For general discussion of the conveyance-contract
dichotomy, see Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279 (1960); Chase,
The Property-Contract Theme in Landlord and Tenant Law: A Critical Commentary on
Schoshinski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 189 (1982).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1976). The official comment pro-
vides: "[The elimination of the doctrine of caveat emptor is accompanied by the adoption of
the doctrine of dependence of promises ..... Id. comment b. The introduction to the
Restatement, entitled "Historical Perspective," states:
[The] ascendant property concept undoubtedly fitted the circumstances of fifteenth
and sixteenth century England, not because of the logic of the theory, but because
in the agrarian economy to which it was applied, it worked. The residue of the pro-
perty theory is to be found today in much of the substantive law of landlord and te-
nant, in the independence of covenants, and in the landlord's broad immunities
from duty and liability .... Extensive covenants, actual or implied, now contain
much of the basis of the landlord-tenant relationship .... The law of the late twen-
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Tenant Act (URLTA).3 The hybrid concept replaces an earlier model
for leases, in which property law, or more precisely the law of con-
veyances, predominated to define the rights and duties of landlord
and tenant. The modern trend is to depart from traditional property
rules by treating the lease as a contract which involves a continuing
exchange of mutually dependent promises. The goal of protecting
tenants has served as the catalyst for the contractualization of the
landlord-tenant relationship. The traditional law was widely per-
ceived as extremely pro-landlord, as applied to residential leases, in
which the conveyance of an interest in land is a secondary feature in
the transaction that is dwarfed by the tenant's expected use of the
improvements and ancillary services. One example of the replace-
ment of a conveyancing rule with a contract rule is the duty recently
imposed on the landlord by a number of courts to mitigate damages
by attempting to relet the premises upon the tenant's abandonment.'
Under traditional property law, the landlord could allow the
premises to remain vacant and recover rent from the abandoning
tenant for the remainder of the term.
Despite the widespread intervention of contract law in leases,
many courts still recognize that the landlord does convey and the
tenant does own an interest in land, so that property rules still have
some application under the modern view. Hence, the modern lease is
called a hybrid. Accordingly, sometimes contract rules and
sometimes property rules will apply to resolve disputes between
tieth century contains a still-shifting balance of property and contract concepts,
with neither clearly in control ....
.. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there have been numerous
statutory and common law developments, most of them gradual, which have been
concerned with adapting the medieval system to changing conditions in an urban
society. The mixture of property and contract concepts tied up in this process of
adaptation has produced the subject set forth in this material on Landlord and Te-
nant.
Id. at 4, 5-6.
3. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT AcT §§ 1.102-.103 (1972). The comment
to § 1.102 states:
[Tihe landlord-tenant relationship was viewed as conveyance of a leasehold estate
and the covenants of the parties generally independent. These doctrines are inap-
propriate to modern urban conditions and inexpressive of the vital interests of the
parties and the public which the law must protect.
This Act recognizes the modern tendency to treat performance of certain obliga-
tions of the parties as interdependent.
4. E.g., Thorne v. Broccoli, 39 Conn. Supp. 289, 478 A.2d 271 (1984) (requiring the
landlord to make reasonable efforts to rent the dwelling unit at a fair rental); Sommer v.
Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 205, 390
N.Y.S.2d 959, 965 (Civ. Ct. 1976), modifiedon other grounds, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d
397 (App. Term. 1978).
[Vol. 35
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landlords and tenants. Which set of rules will apply to any given case
will depend on the nature of the dispute. A jurisdiction must decide
whether it makes more sense to analyze each particular type of
landlord-tenant problem in terms of property law or in terms of con-
tract law. Retaining some property rules is not necessarily pro-land-
lord in result.' For instance, if the tenant asserts a specifically en-
forceable right to possess the leased premises, the tenant is aided by
the recognition that the lease conveys property rights to the tenant. 6
On its face and as applied, the hybrid contract-property approach
to leases ignores tort law. Nonetheless, whether the landlord and ten-
ant are viewed as parties to a contract or parties to a conveyance, it is
abundantly clear that tort law does apply to some aspects of their
relationship. When a tenant or a third party is injured on the leased
property, courts turn to tort law-specifically, to the duties owed to
others by the owners and occupiers of land-to determine whether
the harm is actionable. Of course, this is not the least bit surprising
because personal injury is the historic province of tort law.
Under present law, a residential landlord owes a duty to provide
habitable premises to his tenant. Courts have unanimously selected
contract law to define the habitability duty,7 and as a corollary, have
rejected the application of the property doctrine of independent
covenants to the new duty.8 In doing so, courts have followed the
familiar road of choosing one side of the contract-property concep-
tion of leases to shape the law in a discrete area.
This article explores the emergence and use of contract law as a
theoretical basis for the duty to provide habitable premises. It ex-
amines in detail the topic of tenant remedies for a landlord's failure
to provide habitable premises when the harm complained of is the
5. See generally Humbach, supra note 1, at 1223-32. Humbach explains:
Under the conveyance theory, the tenant's right to possession is enforced as
though the tenant has an ordinary property right in the premises .... Under this
theory, the tenant receives the entire property interest, the right to possession for
the entire [term], all at once at the time of the conveyance ....
.. . Thereafter, the landlord becomes, for purposes of possession, like any other
stranger to the title with the same concominant duty to respect the tenant's posses-
sion as any other third party.
Id. at 1224-26 (footnotes omitted).
6. See Hewitt v. State, 108 Fla. 335, 146 So. 578 (1933); Cooper v. Gordon, 37 N.D.
247, 164 N.W. 21 (1917); Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23 (1911).
7. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970). See infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
8. 428 F.2d at 1082 ("Under contract principles, however, the tenant's obligation to pay
rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligations, including his warranty
to maintain the premises in habitable condition." (footnote omitted)).
1987]
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loss of the use or enjoyment of the premises. Cases in which breach
of the habitability duty allegedly causes physical injury to the tenant
or to third persons are not within the scope of this article. While
there are several recent examples of such cases,' they are exceptional
in incidence and raise markedly different concerns than the more
common situation explored herein where the injury is the mere fact
of living in unrepaired premises, unaccompanied by tangible physical
injury.
This article advances the premise that the hybrid contract-property
model of leases may be appropriate to provide flexible choices for
many areas of landlord-tenant law and, perhaps, may be suitable as
a general model, but that it has failed as applied to the question of
the tenant's remedies for breach of the warranty of habitability. As
applied to remedies, the contract-property hybrid is a false
dichotomy, or perhaps more accurately, the wrong dichotomy. The
proper analysis of tenant remedies when the landlord breaches the
habitability duty requires that a line be drawn between the tort duties
and the contract duties that the landlord owes to the tenant.'0 That
line should be based upon whether the particular habitability duty in
question is waivable by the tenant. Such differentiation of tort and
contract elements of habitability clarifies remedies by focusing the
inquiry on what type of interest is to be protected: a tenant's expect-
ation of habitable premises secured by contract, or a right to
habitable premises imposed as a matter of public policy and pro-
tected under tort principles. Recognition of a tort action for the se-
cond situation permits the fashioning of damage rules that neither
overcompensate nor undercompensate for the tenant's injury. One
principal benefit of the use of tort remedies lies in the analysis of
noneconomic damages-when, for example, the tenant claims men-
tal distress stemming from a habitability failure.
II. ABANDONMENT OF LANDLORD "NO-DUTY" RULES
Prior to the 1960s, caveat emptor reigned supreme in the
American law of landlord-tenant, with the result that the landlord
had virtually no legal responsibility for the condition of the leased
premises. "No-duty" rules protected the landlord, whether the
plaintiff's cause of action sounded in contract, based upon an im-
9. The trend of the cases has been to allow recovery for personal injuries. See, e.g.,
Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985); Trentacost v.
Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Rivera v. Solfon Home Repairs & Improvements
Co., 294 Pa. Super. 41, 439 A.2d 739 (1982). But see Auburn v. Amoco Oil Co., 106 Ill. App.
3d 60, 435 N.E.2d 780 (1982); Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 178-202.
[Vol. 35
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plied covenant to repair some part of the premises, or in tort, based
on a duty to prevent harm to others by taking reasonable care of the
premises. The past two decades have witnessed extraordinary fer-
ment in the law applied to residential leases, which has been so
drastic and rapid that it has earned the label "revolution."" Both
the contract and the tort no-duty rules have fallen.
A. Rise of the Warranty of Habitability
Under the traditional principles of the common law, the landlord
generally had no duty to repair or maintain the premises either at the
outset of the term, if there was a defect in the premises when the par-
ties made their lease,I2 or thereafter, if a defect arose after the tenant
took possession. 3 Indeed, if the premises became in need of repair
during the lease term, it was the tenant's duty to make repairs, unless
the problem could be traced to a casualty that was not the tenant's
fault. If the tenant failed to perform his repair duties, the landlord's
remedies were governed by the law of waste. '
This doctrine can be called a contractual "no-duty" rule because
it rested upon the assumed intentions of the parties. Accordingly, its
application could be altered by contract. If the tenant desired that
the landlord take some responsibility for repairs, and the parties
reached agreement on that point, then the tenant obtained an express
covenant by the landlord to repair, which courts would enforce in
accordance with its terms.'" If; on the other hand, the lease was
11. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residen-
tial Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 6 (1979); Rabin, The Revolution in
Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517
(1984).
12. E.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1979); Anderson Drive-in
Theatre v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506 (1953); Gehrke v. General Theatre
Corp., 207 Neb. 301, 298 N.W.2d 773 (1980). This rule is an application of caveat emptor,
premised upon the tenant's ability to inspect the property to determine its suitability prior to
the execution of a lease. An exception existed when the landlord failed to disclose to the tenant
a latent defect of which the landlord had knowledge. See, e.g., Taylor v. Leedy & Co., 412 So.
2d 763 (Ala. 1982); Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975).
13. E.g., Yuan Kane Ing v. Levy, 26 Il1. App. 3d 889, 326 N.E.2d 51 (1975); Cooley v.
Bettigole, I Mass. App. Ct. 515, 301 N.E.2d 872 (1973); Ball v. Day, 57 Or. App. 384, 644
P.2d 649 (1982).
14. E.g., Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979) (tenant's duty to exercise or-
dinary care in the use of leased premises, not to cause any material and permanent injury
thereto over and above the ordinary wear and tear; tenant liability to landlord for damages
resulting from tenant's wrongful acts or failure to exercise such care); Verlinden v. Godber-
son, 238 Iowa 161, 25 N.W.2d 347 (1946) (landlord has action of forcible entry and detainer to
remedy tenant's commission of waste); Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976) (tenant's
implied covenant not to commit waste).
15. E.g., Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 Il. App. 2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965) (express
1987]
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silent on the issue of landlord repairs, it was presumed that the "no-
duty" rule reflected the parties' intent and, thus, their bargain. This
presumption may have made a good deal of sense when it arose in
preindustrial England because the normal lease was for the long-
term rental of agricultural land.
Javins v. First National Realty Corp. ,l6 decided in 1970, sounded
the death knell for the contract "no-duty" rule. The new doctrine
announced by Javins, called an implied warranty of habitability,
places a repair obligation on the landlord. The theory used by the
Javins court was that the landlord warranted that the premises were
habitable at the outset of the term and would remain so during the
period of the tenant's occupancy. Judge Skelly Wright, writing for
the District of Columbia Circuit, stated:
[A] warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set out in the
Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation
of law into leases of urban dwelling units ....
... [Bly signing the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing
obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all ap-
plicable law.II
By the end of the 1970s, no less than 31 states had followed the
Javins lead, either by judicial decision or by statute. I8 To date, only
seven jurisdictions can be considered as still adhering generally to the
common law "no-duty" rule for residential leases.19
covenant to make specific repairs); Lealiou v. Quatsoe, 15 Wis. 2d 128, 112 N.W.2d 193
(1961) (express written covenant overlapping with statutory duty to repair); see also Rossiter v.
Moore, 59 Wash. 2d 722, 370 P.2d 250 (1962) (validating oral agreement to repair).
16. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
17. Id. at 1072-73, 1081.
18. See Cunningham, supra note 11, at 7-9 (listing 31 jurisdictions that in the late 1970s
had a judicial or statutory warranty of habitability).
19. Thirty-nine states presently have statutes requiring that residential landlords supply
habitable dwelling units. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324
(Supp. 1986); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1 (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7 (1985);
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (1985); GA. CODE § 44-7-13 (1982);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 521.42 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1979); IOWA CODE §
562A.15 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2692, 2693, 2695, 2717 (West
1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980 & Supp. 1986); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 8-211 (1981 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127A, 127L, ch. 239, § 8A
(West 1983 & Supp. 1986); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 554.139 (1981); MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (1982);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500, 441.510 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.290 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:42-88 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (1982); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§
301, 302(l)(b) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW §§ 305, 305-a (McKin-
ney 1952 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1987) (generally ap-
plicable warranty of habitability); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. §§ 755, 770 (McKinney 1979 &
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B. Landlord's New Liability in Tort
The tort no-duty rule, which treated the tenant and not the
landlord as the landowner, fit hand in glove with the traditional con-
tractual allocation of repair responsibility between the parties to the
lease. If a dangerous condition on the premises caused personal in-
jury to the tenant or a third party, tort law generally insulated the
landlord from liability with a "no-duty" rule." Limited exceptions
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 1986); OR.
REV. STAT. § 91.770 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§- 34-18-16, 45-24.3-6 (1980 & Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-9 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (Vernon 1984); VA.
CODE § 55-248.13 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §
37-6-30 (1985); WIS. STAT. § 704.07 (1980). Subsequent to Javins, the District of Columbia
housing regulations were amended to include a warranty of habitability. D.C. Hous. Regs. §
2902 (1980). For a description and analysis of the different types of habitability statutes, see
Cunningham, supra note 11, at 6-9, 23-74.
Courts in nineteen jurisdictions have recognized a common law implied warranty of
habitability. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111.
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App.
1976), vacated, 369 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. 1977) (but see Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to extend implied warranty of habitability to rental of single-
family, used dwelling)); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214
Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984); Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Tonetti v.
Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289
N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979);
Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Birkenhead v. Coombs, 143 Vt. 167, 465
A.2d 244 (1983); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Teller v. McCoy, 162
W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961)
(but see Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970) (arguably overruling
Pines sub silentio)). Of these jurisdictions, only four-Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire, and
Vermont-have no statutory habitability duty. Jurisdictions have differed as to whether
statutory and common-law rights will coexist. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.061 (Ver-
non Supp. 1986) (making statute the exclusive remedy "in lieu of existing common law," ef-
fectively overruling Kamarath).
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming still
adhere to the common-law position that the landlord has no repair obligations in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary. Martin v. Springdale Stores, Inc., 354 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. Civ.
App.), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1978); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 661 S.W.2d 393
(1983); Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 334, 558 P.2d 563 (1976); Cappaert v. Junker, 413
So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982); Paxton v. Hinkle, 282 S.C. 273, 318 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984);
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1981) (refusing to address habitability in tenant per-
sonal injury action due to abbreviated briefing of issue). Wyoming has no case law authority
on point and accordingly the common-law rule is assumed to be presently operative.
20. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hamilton Gardens, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 255, 229 A.2d 705,
cert. denied, 154 Conn. 719, 222 A.2d 809 (1966); Cuthbert v. Stempin, 78 I11. App. 3d 562,
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to the tort no-duty rule had developed, however, to cover three
situations: (1) when the landlord, but not the tenant, knew of a la-
tent defect;2 (2) when the defect was in a common area shared by
more than one tenant;22 and (3) when the landlord negligently at-
tempted to repair the premises.23
Change in the tort "no-duty" rule occurred during the same time
period that the warranty of habitability was being embraced, but on
a less drastic and widespread scale.24 Several jurisdictions abrogated
the rule wholesale and imposed a duty of reasonable care on the
landlord to safeguard against defects on the premises that could
cause personal injury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court's 1973
decision in Sargent v. Ross25 is the paramount example.26 Other
jurisdictions, while retaining the "no-duty" rule in name, have made
incremental changes in their law by expanding the scope of the ex-
396 N.E. 2d 1197 (1979); Roan v. Bruckner, 180 Neb. 399, 143 N.W.2d 108 (1966); Marston v.
Andler, 80 N.H. 564, 122 A. 329 (1923); Williams v. Riley, 56 N.C. App. 427, 289 S.E.2d 102
(1982) (applying South Carolina law). See generally Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective
Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 48-78 (1975).
21. E.g., Hall v. Cohner, 134 Ga. App. 586, 215 S.E.2d 340 (1975); Smith v. Green, 358
Mass. 76, 260 N.E.2d 656 (1970); Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S.W. 914 (1896); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965) (liability when landlord knows or should know
of latent defect if tenant does not know or have reason to know of the condition).
22. E.g., Sollars v. Blayney, 31 Ill. App. 2d 341, 176 N.E.2d 477 (1961); Anderson v.
Marston, 161 Me. 378, 213 A.2d 48 (1965); Geesing v. Pendergrass, 417 P.2d 322 (Okla.
1966).
23. E.g., Hayes v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 681 (D. Mont. 1979) (applying the
negligent repair rule, but finding no liability because the tenant knew of the defect); Jordan v.
Savage, 88 111. App. 2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580 (1967); Berger v. Stoner, 357 Mass. 659, 259
N.E.2d 774 (1970) (approving negligent repair rule, but finding no liability under the facts);
see also Towers Tenant Ass'n v. Towers Ltd. Partnership, 563 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1983)
(landlord is liable to tenants not choosing to purchase conversion condominium units but com-
pleting their term when the negligent renovation and repair of units results in injury).
24. For a discussion of the new tort liabilities of landlords for personal injuries, see
Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99
(1982). Professor Browder analyzes the impact of the habitability duties on the tort standards.
25. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). "[W]e today discard the rule of 'caveat lessee'
and the doctrine of landlord nonliability in tort to which it gave birth . . . . Henceforth,
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm." Id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
26. Other jurisdictions have followed Sargent, recognizing that the landlord has a general
tort duty of reasonable care. Brennan v. Cockrell lnvs., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 122 (1973); Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984); Young v. Garwacki,
380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (1980) (personal injuries of guest); Jordan v. Goddard, 14
Mass. App. 723, 442 N.E.2d 1162 (1982) (applying Garwacki retroactively to tenant's personal
injuries); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979); see Old Town
Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976) (adopting Sargent language),
superseded, 267 Ind. 176, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977) (settlement of parties); cf. Presson v. Moun-
tain States Properties, 18 Ariz. App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972) (pre-Sargent decision; landlord
has a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances).
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ceptions to the doctrine.27 Some courts in this group have expanded
the exceptions to the point where they have swallowed up the "no-
duty" rule, retaining only its hollow shell.28
III. BASIS FOR HABITABILITY: TORT DISGUISED AS CONTRACT
A. Development of Contractual Formulation
The expressed theory underlying judicial recognition of the im-
plied warranty of habitability sounded in contract. Traditional
landlord-tenant rules were perceived by many as extremely pro-
landlord because of the property, or conveyancing, background of
landlord-tenant law. That view may be debated as a matter of
English legal history,29 but nonetheless, that diagnosis of the evil
predominated. The cure prescribed by the courts, starting with
Javins, was the infusion of contract law into the landlord-tenant
relationship. Rather than view the landlord-tenant relationship as a
mere conveyance, permitting the landlord to exit from the scene
after conveying possessory rights to the tenant, the modern lease was
seen as a continuous exchange of values-rent is exchanged for the
leased premises in a certain condition of repair and for a package of
27. See Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord has a tort duty to main-
tain premises he controls, which includes common areas used by tenants); Wilson v. Wilson,
382 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (liability for failure to disclose latent defect when
landlord has constructive knowledge of defect); Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d
844 (1943) (landlord liable for negligent repairs made voluntarily, even if the repairs did not
add to the danger or give a deceptive appearance of safety).
28. See Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (landlord who has no duty to
repair is liable for negligent repairs made by independent contractor hired by landlord);
Shirkey v. Crain & Assocs. Management Co., 129 Ariz. 128, 629 P.2d 95 (1981) (landlord duty
to make reasonable inspection to discover latent defect); Fitzgerald v. 667 Hotel Corp., 103
Misc. 2d 80, 426 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (landlord's right of entry to make repairs con-
stitutes control of premises subjecting landlord to tort liability).
29. See Humbach, supra note 1, at 1213-23. In Humbach's view, the common-law con-
ception of the landlord-tenant relationship results naturally from the interplay between the
basic law of property and of contract. Landlord-tenant law consists of two intertwined legal
relationships: privity of contract, based on contract, and privity of estate, based on owner-
ship. The dual relationship exists not out of necessity, for the rights and duties arising out of
privity of estate could be founded and enforced on a purely contractual basis; but rather,
because the modern law of contract did not exist when, in the fifteenth century, the need arose
to reformulate the conceptualization of legal rights and duties existing between landlords and
tenants. The logical basis was the feudal relation of landlord and tenant. With the develop-
ment of contract law with routinely enforceable promises, contract theory served not only as a
supplementary basis for the enforcement of the rights and duties incident to privity of estate,
but it also provided a framework for the creation and enforcement of other obligations and ex-
pectations. The addition of contract law upon the existing skeleton of property law evolved in-
to the dual relationship of which landlord-tenant law is composed.
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services that make the premises livable. Language from the Javins
opinion is typical of this judicial approach:
Some courts have realized that certain of the old rules of property law
governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions. In order to
reach results more in accord with the legitimate expectations of the parties
and the standards of the community, courts have been gradually introduc-
ing more modern precepts of contract law in interpreting leases ....
In our judgment the trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise and
well considered. Our holding is this case reflects a belief that leases of ur-
ban dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other con-
tract.
• . . Contract principles established in other areas of the law provide a
more rational framework for the apportionment of landlord-tenant
responsibilities; they strongly suggest that a warranty of habitability be im-
plied into all contracts for urban dwellings.30
Some courts, rather than boldly departing from the tradition that
emphasized the conveyancing aspects of leases and the tenant's
ownership of property or an estate, referred to the modern residen-
tial lease as a hybrid, having the dual character of a conveyance and
a contract.3 Such courts, however, stressed that the duty to provide
habitable premises was an implied "covenant" or "warranty,"
thereby arriving at the same conclusion as the courts, like Javins,
that said a lease is now just a contract.
When addressing the issue of remedies, all courts, whether or not
they referred to the lease as a hybrid, applied contract remedies when
a breach of the warranty of habitability was shown." Most of the
energies of the courts in the early cases were spent on changing the
"no-duty" rule and creating substantive rights. Much of what those
courts, such as Javins, said about the selection of remedies can be
viewed as dicta. Like much of modern lawmaking, the pattern of
development in these cases was first to identify the tenant's right to
habitable premises and define its scope, leaving for later case-law
development the specific questions of what remedies will be available
to enforce the newly-found tenant right.33 By and large, however,
30. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75, 1080 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
31. E.g., King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
32. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1073 (breach of implied warranty of habitability gives
rise to usual remedies for breach of contract); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972);
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984); Teller v. McCoy, 162
W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978) (specific performance excepted by statute).
33. This process of first recognizing rights, then developing remedies to secure those
rights, appears quite logical to the modern lawyer. Nonetheless, it stands diametrically op-
posed to the common-law tradition. Under the English writ system, judicial recognition of
[Vol. 35
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the later cases have failed to come up with any fresh ideas on the
issue of remedies."' Instead, the statements of the early courts that
all contract remedies generally apply were parrotted in subsequent
appellate opinions.
Why did the courts choose to make habitability a creature of con-
tract? To justify the new duty, courts drew upon developing con-
cepts in the law of sales and product liability. In Javins, Judge
Wright's use in 1970 of sales precedents is especially significant." By
the 1960s widespread reform of the law of sales was well under way
and lead to the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code.36
Consumer protection against defective products was also an emerg-
ing field, as reflected and encouraged by Prosser's Citadel articles.37
Reform of landlord-tenant law in the direction of tenant protection
was seen as a parallel to the developments in sales and product
liability law.
My purpose is not to analyze the similarities and differences bet-
ween residential leases and sales of goods to consumers and question
asserted property rights depended solely upon the scope of each of the writs. See T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 335-58, 361 (4th ed. 1948). For exam-
ple, to determine whether a finder of lost chattels had a property interest therein, courts first
asked whether trover lie against a third party who interfered with the finder's possession of the
chattel. If trover lie, a consequence of that procedural decision was that the finder had a pro-
perty right of some sort; if trover did not lie, the finder had no property. See Armory v.
Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K. B. 1722).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 47-102.
35. Judge Wright explained:
Modern contract law has recognized that the buyer of goods and services in an in-
dustrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier to assure
that goods and services purchased are of adequate quality .... Thus without any
special agreement a merchant will be held to warrant that his goods are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used and that they are at least of
reasonably average quality ....
• . . In a lease contract, a tenant seeks to purchase from his landlord shelter for a
specified period of time. The landlord sells housing as a commercial businessman
and has much greater opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain
the condition of his building. Moreover, the tenant must rely upon the skill and
bona fides of his landlord at least as much as a car buyer must rely upon the car
manufacturer.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075, 1079.
36. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-301 (1973);
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the UCC, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); Men-
tachikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36
A.B.A.J. 419 (1950); Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967).
37. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Pro-
sser, The Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
1987]
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whether on policy grounds seller liability for goods was properly
transplanted to lessors of dwelling units. That has already been
done.38 Rather, the point here is that use of the analogy between the
two resulted in the incorporation of the then-prevalent sales and pro-
duct liability vocabulary into landlord-tenant law. The landlord's
new duty was called an "implied warranty," which was assumed to
be contractual. This characterization required a severe wrenching of
the term "warranty," a term whose meaning in the sales and pro-
ducts areas was already cloudy at best." The warranty concept might
legitimately have been applied to latent defects in existence when the
lease was entered into (or possession transferred), but could not
apply to a duty to maintain the premises arising thereafter. The term
"warranty" signifies a person's representation of a state of facts that
exist at the time the representation is made, and clearly is not
synonymous with a promise that a person will do something in the
future. Prosser criticized the use of warranty in the law of product
liability, calling it a "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of
tort and contract." ' 0 His criticism was substantially heeded in that
area of law, as evidenced by the strict liability approach of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.," Nevertheless, the war-
ranty concept has remained the basis for the landlord's habitability
duty despite its even poorer fit here than in the area of products
liability.
Why should one care about the labels selected by courts to
describe the new set of landlord obligations to repair the premises?
Etymologists tell us that words commonly do change meaning over
time, picking up new nuances and usages. So what if the habitability
idea had been named after a vegetable-say, a potato? The concern
here, however, is not merely linguistic neatness or aesthetics. If it
were, perhaps we could devote some care to those matters, but we
should not overwork ourselves on such questions of form. The pro-
blem transcends nomenclature because "warranty" and "contract"
labels carry much other baggage with them. This article principally
considers one vice of the terminology: the effect of these labels on
the remedies that are available for a breach of the warranty of
habitability. There are, in addition, other problems presented by the
38. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,
56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 30-34 (1976); see generally Note, The Landlord as a Retailer? Strict Pro-
ducts Liability and the Landlord-Tenant Relationship in California: Becker v. IRM Corpora-
tion, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 524 (1985) (discussing Becker court's reasoning in analogizing
landlords to manufacturers and retailers).
39. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 37, at 1124-34.
40. Id. at 1126.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
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contractual nature of the habitability duty. Statutes of limitations
often set different periods of time for contract actions than for other
causes of action. Privity questions may be presented when the
original tenant or landlord has transferred all or part of their interest
in the leased premises.42 For example, given that habitability is a
covenant in the original lease, can a sublessee sue the original lessor
for a breach of habitability?
Another problem area involves disclaimers or waivers. Ordinarily,
of course, contract rights depend upon the mutual intent of the par-
ties. Thus, implied contract terms can be modified or waived if that
intent is sufficiently manifested. If the habitability duty were
waivable under ordinary contract principles, landlords would
routinely obtain waivers by using a standardized provision in their
lease forms. Naturally, this prospect was seen as unappealing by pro-
ponents of the habitability duty who believed that in actual practice
the duty should mean something. The court in Javins made the im-
plied warranty of habitability nonwaivable,43 and the weight of
subsequent authorities, both case and statutory law, have followed
this lead."" The Restatement (Second) of Property, however, permits
waiver if it is not unconscionable,45 borrowing the unconscionability
42. Under standard property law, a sublessee has neither privity of contract nor privity of
estate with the original lessor and, as a consequence, cannot enforce duties arising under the
original lease. No cases discussing privity in the context of habitability have been found. Other
cases suggest that a sublessee would not be permitted to enforce the lessor's habitability duties
under the original lease. See Rittenberg v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 426 A.2d 338, 342 (D.C.
1981); Employees Consumer Org., Inc. v. Gorman's, Inc., 395 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Mo. 1965)
(sublessee cannot enforce lessor's covenant to rebuild upon fire). But see Marchese v. Stan-
dard Realty & Dev. Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 142, 141 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1977) (original lessor's ex-
press approval of sublessee makes sublessee a third party beneficiary of original implied cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment).
43. 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.) ("The duties imposed by the Housing Regulations
may not be waived or shifted by agreement if the Regulations specifically place the duty upon
the lessor."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
44. George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. 1983); Berman & Sons,
Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979); Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50,
390 A.2d 240 (1978); see generally Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Residential Leases, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (1978).
45. The Restatement provides:
The parties to a lease may agree to increase or decrease what would otherwise be
the obligations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the leased property
and may agree to expand or contract what would otherwise be the remedies
available to the tenant for the breach of those obligations, and those agreements are
valid and binding on the parties to the lease unless they are unenforceable in whole
or in part because they are unconscionable or significantly against public policy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1976). Contra, UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TE-
NANT ACT § 1.403(a)(1) (1972) (prohibits provisions waiving the rights and remedies contained
in the Act).
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doctrine from the Uniform Commercial Code.46 Confusion in many
jurisdictions over the waiver issue still lingers, and this confusion
stems directly from the contractual formulation of the habitability
doctrine.
B. Effect on Remedies
Present case law, the Restatement (Second) of Property, and
statutes based upon the URLTA are strongly committed to the con-
tractual basis of the landlord's habitability duty, both for defining
the contours of the substantive right and for tenant remedies. This
contractual orientation has dramatically shaped the evolving case
law on remedies.
1. Damages
The problem of how to measure the damage to a tenant caused by
a breach of the duty of habitability has plagued the courts. Three
different measures of damage have been used: (1) fair rental value as
repaired less fair rental value in the unrepaired condition;47 (2)
agreed rent less fair rental value in the unrepaired condition;48 and
(3) percentage reduction in fair rental value.49
46. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (general unconscionability section for Article 2). The interplay
between several sections of the Uniform Commercial Code must be considered to determine
when disclaimers of implied warranties under U.C.C. § 2-316 are valid. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1974) (disclaimer that complies with U.C.C. § 2-316 cannot
violate U.C.C. § 2-719(3) unconscionability provision applying to limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warran-
ties and Limitation of Damagesfor Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEX. L. REV. 60
(1974).
47. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 111. 2d 1,479 N.E.2d 915 (1985); Roeder v. Nolan, 321 N.W.2d I (Iowa
1982); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d
304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Hilder
v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984); Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d
114 (1978).
48. Wellborn v. Society for Propagation of Faith, 411 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 11l N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Park West Manage-
ment Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 992 (1979); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, 109 Misc. 2d 47, 442 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term
1981); Lane v. Kelley, 57 Or. App. 197, 643 P.2d 1375, cert. denied, 293 Or. 394, 650 P.2d 927
(1982); Beausang v. Bernotas, 296 Pa. Super. 335, 442 A.2d 796 (1982); Fair v. Negley, 257
Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978); Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa. Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087
(1978); Birkenhead v. Coombs, 143 Vt. 167, 465 A.2d 244 (1983).
49. Cazares v. Ortiz, 109 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 23, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1980); Winchester
Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976); McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct.
304, 362 N.E.2d 548 (1977); Housing Auth. v. Scott, 137 N.J. Super. 110, 348 A.2d 195
(1975); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (1975);
HeinOnline  -- 35 U. Kan. L. Rev. 518 1986-1987
BREACH OF HABITABILITY
Which measure a jurisdiction has selected can be evaluated in
terms of its commitment to the contractual theory of habitability.
The first measure on its face gives the tenant the benefit of his
bargain, in theory putting him in the same economic position he
would have been in had the landlord performed his habitability duty.
This measure of damages is the normal contract damage rule,50 and
such damages are perfectly compensatory. After collecting such
damages, the tenant is no better or worse off than had performance
been given, ignoring litigation costs and possible consequential
damages. A jurisdiction that is truly committed to the use of con-
tract remedies for breach of the duty of habitability should adopt
this measure.
Some jurisdictions have rejected the pure benefit-of-the-bargain
approach in favor of the second or third measure of damages. This
rejection might represent an implicit questioning of the contractual
nature of the duty of habitability, but another explanation is also
possible-the goal of fashioning damage rules that are adminis-
tratively workable. Use of the first measure requires expert
testimony or other proof of two different fair rental values.
Presumably, real estate appraisers could testify as to these values
based upon their compilations of data concerning comparable rental
properties. As a practical matter, however, the sums involved in a
typical residential landlord-tenant dispute would seldom justify the
cost of obtaining such information and introducing it into court as
evidence. 5' Therefore, although a comparison of fair rental values
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Il1 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Whitehall Hotel v.
Gaynor, 121 Misc. 2d 736, 470 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Civ. Ct. 1983); Leris Realty Corp. v. Robbins,
95 Misc. 2d 712, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 166 (Civ. Ct. 1978); Goldner v. Doknovitch, 88 Misc. 2d 88,
388 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Term 1976); Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc. 2d 813,
386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. City. Ct. 1971); Gilbert v. District Court, 67 Or. App. 148, 676 P.2d 917
(1984); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405
A.2d 897 (1979).
50. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTS § 12.1, at 812-13 (1982). The benefit of the bargain is
based not on the injured party's subjective hopes at the time he made the contract, but on the
actual value that the contract would have had to him had it been performed. This amount is
deemed to be the value of the expectation interest. Id.
51. On this basis a number of courts have permitted tenants to prove damages through
the testimony of nonexperts. For example, the court in Birkenhead v. Coombs, 143 Vt. 167,
465 A.2d 244 (1983), stated:
[1In residential lease disputes involving a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, public policy militates against requiring expert testimony: "Useful ex-
pert testimony is unlikely to be readily available as the the 'worth' of the defects
.... and even if it were available, the imposition upon indigent tenants of the
financial burden of supplying expert witnesses would seriously diminish the effec-
tiveness of the relief" . . .
1987)
HeinOnline  -- 35 U. Kan. L. Rev. 519 1986-1987
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
may be the best measure in theory, the practical difficulties of ap-
plication to the normal case may lead courts to select other
measures. This may be true even if the court ordinarily is committed
to treating the duty of habitability as a contract doctrine.
The second measure of damages for breach of the duty of habit-
ability-the agreed rent less the fair rental value of the unrepaired
premises is simpler to apply, but not dramatically so. The agreed
rent is a given; to ascertain it, one need only examine the terms of the
lease. Thus, the only remaining item to be proven by the tenant to
establish damages is the fair rental value of the premises in their
uninhabitable condition. Although initially it might seem that this
cuts the evidentiary work in half, this usually is not so. If appraisers
or other expert witnesses are necessary, the incremental cost of ask-
ing them to express an opinion on a second fair rental value may be
low. Moreover, one must question whether there is a market for
unrepaired rental units, for the inquiry into fair rental value of the
unrepaired premises is meaningful only if such a market can be
identified.
How far this second measure of damages departs from the con-
tract norm of the benefit of the bargain depends upon what assump-
tions are made about the residential rental market. Some courts that
employ this measure may assume that the agreed rent is equal to the
fair rental value of the repaired habitable dwelling unit.52 In many
cases this assumption will be correct, in which event this measure
produces the same result as the pure benefit-of-the-bargain ap-
proach. However, the assumption fails in two instances. First, the
Id. at 173, 465 A.2d at 247 (quoting McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 311, 362
N.E.2d 548, 553 (1977)). See also Cazares v. Ortiz, 109 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 23, 168 Cal. Rptr.
143 (1977); Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985); Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970) (use of expert testimony would not add to
accuracy or certainty of damages); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316,
391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979) (both landlord and te-
nant, being intimately familiar with the condition of the premises both before and after any
breach, are competent to testify as to diminution in value occasioned by the breach); see
generally Abbott, supra note 38, at 23.
52. Glasoe v. Trimble, 107 111. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985); Darmetko v. Boston Hous.
Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47
N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); 111 East
88th Partners v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 434 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (agreed rent is
competent evidence of fair market value of premises as warranted unless evidence is produced
to show otherwise); Gilbert v. District Court, 67 Or. App. 148, 676 P.2d 917 (1984); Lane v.
Kelly, 57 Or. App. 197, 643 P.2d 1375 (1982); L & M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 44 Or. App. 309,
605 P.2d 1347 (1980) (absent express agreement to contrary, rental agreement showing agreed
monthly rental is presumed to establish reasonable rental for premises in habitable condition,
thus estopping landlord from contending otherwise). Contra, Cazares v. Ortiz, 109 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 23, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1977).
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agreed rent may not be equal to the fair rental value at the time the
lease is made if either the landlord or the tenant obtained an advant-
ageous lease. Such a bargain may result when one party has superior
knowledge of market conditions or greater negotiation skills. Se-
cond, a divergence occurs whenever rental values increase or
decrease between the time the lease is signed and the breach. In
either event, this damage measure does not perfectly compensate the
tenant for the benefit of his bargain-it either overcompensates or
undercompensates him.
The third measure of damages computes the tenant's loss by ap-
plying some percentage to the agreed rent. This percentage-
reduction-in-value test may be formulated in one of two ways. First,
the court may simply determine what percentage of the landlord's
promises, en toto, have been performed? If the landlord's breach of
the duty of habitability affects 75 percent of the premises and the
monthly rent is $400, then the damages are $300 per month. Con-
ceivably, this test might require one to make a detailed determina-
tion of the number of rooms or square feet of the premises that are
rendered uninhabitable by a given defect.53 In practice, however, this
measure seems designed to permit a fact finder simply to pick a
number for the percentage; in other words, to make a "gut level"
evaluation of how much value the tenant has lost without the need
for resort to evidence of fair rental values or of precisely how many
rooms or square feet are affected by the breach.54
A variant of this third measure uses the ratio of the fair rental
value of the unrepaired premises to the fair rental value of the
53. See Whitehall Hotel v. Gaynor, 121 Misc. 2d 736, 470 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Civ. Ct. 1983)
(delayed installation of major fixtures and appliances in bathrooms and kitchens rendered the
units substantially uninhabitable, justifying in some cases 100%'o abatement of rent); Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Timber
Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (1975); Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown, 11 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d
996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Cir. Ct. 1973).
54. The opinion in McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 362 N.E.2d 548 (1977), il-
lustrates how a test that sounds technical and precise can hide substantial approximation.
Therein, the court stated that a percentage reduction factor, representing a percentage diminu-
tion of the total use, is assigned to each major violation or defect on the premises. Then, the
percentages are summed to arrive at the total percentage reduction. That reduction in the
weekly rent becomes the assessed damages. After describing these steps, however, the court
hedges by saying that this is an uncertain process and an approximation is permissable if the
evidence shows the amount to be "just and reasonable." Id. at 311, 362 N.E.2d at 553. See
also Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 48 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d
897 (1979); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (1975). But
see Goldner v. Doknovitch, 88 Misc. 2d 88, 388 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Term 1976) (damages
cannot be ascertained by mere guesswork).
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habitable unit as the percentage applied to the agreed rent." It is dif-
ficult to see why this measure should ever be used. It has all the
evidentiary handicaps of the pure benefit-of-the-bargain approach,
as both fair rental values must be determined. Yet it is perfectly com-
pensatory only when the agreed rent equals the fair rental value of
the habitable premises at the time of breach. Nevertheless, the
Restatement has adopted this measure for its rental abatement rule,56
which defines the tenant's damage rights prior to termination of the
lease. A comment to the Restatement indicates that this rule is in-
tended "to preserve the parties' original bargain in so far as
possible."" The Restatement examples do not elucidate what this
cryptic statement may mean. Clearly, the parties did not originally
bargain for this percentage measure of damages; if they did, the
issue would be one of the validity of a liquidated damages provision.
Are the Restatement authors suggesting that as part of the original
bargain, the parties implicitly agreed that the fair rental value and
agreed rent would remain equal throughout the term? Obviously,
such a bargain in fact is unlikely.
One court58 has implicitly adopted the Restatement test in order to
prevent the tenant from having a damage claim that exceeds the
amount of rent due under the lease. The apparent rationale is that
under certain circumstances the landlord would in effect pay the te-
nant to stay in the premises. Why this is objectionable is not ad-
dressed. If rising rental values give the tenant an extremely advan-
tageous lease, why shouldn't the tenant be fully compensated upon
the landlord's breach even if the damage award exceeds the rent? In
the sale of goods, there certainly is no rule that limits benefit-of-the-
bargain damages to the purchase price for an item.
One basic assumption about the bargaining process that is in-
herent in contract theory generally underlies all three damage awards
for breach of the duty of habitability. The basis of the bargain bet-
ween landlord and tenant is that the premises are to be habitable
throughout the term of the lease. Although this may be true for
55. See Cazares v. Ortiz, 109 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 23, 32, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108, 112-13
(1980) (rejecting the Restatement approach as "mind boggling" and necessitating "expert
testimony").
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (1976).
57. The comment states in full:
Measure of abatement-preserving the original bargain. So long as the facts of
the relationship do not vary too far from those originally contemplated by the par-
ties, it is desirable to preserve their original bargain in so far as possible. This is the
effect of the proportional rule stated in this section.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 comment c (1976).
58. See McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 310-11, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552-53 (1977).
The court fails to cite the Restatement.
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middle-class and upper-class rental housing, this premise fails for the
typical lease of slum housing. 9 There, patent defects in the premises
are present when the lease is made, and the agreed rent reflects the
tenant's expectation that he will live in dilapidated housing. Such
tenants cannot afford habitable housing and must live in substan-
dard housing at a lower rent. For this type of case, the pure benefit-
of-the-bargain measure results in significant damage awards to
tenants for bargains that were not in fact made. If this is justifiable,
it must be for policy reasons wholly apart from the contract ideal of
compensating for economic harm caused by a breach of promise."' It
should be noted that the second damage measure-agreed rent less
fair rental value in unrepaired condition-results in no damages if
faithfully applied to the prototypical slum lease described above.
This suggests 'another motivation of the courts that have adopted
this measure: an unstated movement away from the contract theory
of the duty of habitability as applied to slum leases. With this
measure, damage awards that approximate the parties' bargain can
be given when the parties in fact expected the premises to be
habitable, but damages based upon a fictional bargain in the slum
housing context are eliminated. On this issue, the third measure-the
proportionate reduction of the agreed rent-in effect splits the mid-
dle, producing results that lie between those stemming from the
other two measures. The tenant will always receive some damages if
a breach of habitability is established, but in contrast to the pure
benefit-of-the-bargain measure, the damages are reduced because
the base for calculation is the low agreed rent for the slum lease.
2. Termination
There is widespread agreement among the courts that termination
of the lease is a proper remedy for breach of the warranty of
habitability. Termination extinguishes the tenant's obligation to pay
rent and the tenant's right to possession as of the date of termina-
tion. To invoke the termination remedy the Restatement6 I and most
courts62 require that the tenant notify the landlord of his election to
terminate while the premises are uninhabitable.
59. See generally Abbott, supra note 38; Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and The
American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 180-90.
61. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.1 (1976).
62. Glasco v. Trinkle, 107 I11. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978),
aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984);
Teller v. McCoy, 162 W.Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978); cf. George Washington Univ. v.
Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. 1983) (actual notice not required if landlord in exercise of
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Termination is not necessarily inconsistent with the tenant remedy
of damages. The two remedies can be coupled together when
damages are claimed from the time of breach to the date of termina-
tion. 63
One issue that is largely unsettled is how the right to terminate for
breach of habitability relates to the constructive eviction doctrine. A
few jurisdictions have considered the question in a cursory manner,
reaching different conclusions." There are at least three possible
resolutions. First, constructive eviction might not apply at all to the
issue of habitability. This result would follow from the view that
contract law alone defines habitability. Decisions adopting the duty
of habitability generally embrace contract law, rejecting traditional
landlord-tenant law. That rejection has been primarily used to
eradicate the ancient rule that lease covenants are independent.
Under that rule, a breach by one party of a lease covenant does not
excuse performance of lease covenants by the other party. A broad
rejection of traditional landlord-tenant law, however, could also in-
clude disavowal of constructive eviction. In that case, contract law
would provide the sole basis for the right to terminate, and it would
appear that the contract doctrine of substantial performance is the
justification for termination. The landlord has not substantially per-
formed if the breach of the warranty of habitability is a material
breach of the lease. Ordinarily, a breach of the warranty of
habitability will be material. Indeed, most jurisdictions define
habitability in terms of material or substantial impairment of the
premises. Therefore, in those jurisdictions if the tenant is able to
prove any breach of habitability it will be a substantial breach just-
ifying termination.
reasonable care should have been aware of the defective condition); Freeman v. G.T.S. Corp.,
363 So. 2d 1247 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (oral notice satisfies requirement that tenant notify
landlord of defective premises); Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 396 N.E.2d
981 (1979) (notice requirement is not to assure the landlord a reasonable time to repair, but
rather is designed to minimize the time the landlord is in breach and hence to mitigate the per-
missible period of abatement of rent).
63. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) (if tenant who vacates has an advan-
tageous lease, he is entitled to recover from landlord the benefit of his bargain, that is, the
value of the lease for the unexpired period); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973).
64. Compare King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (tending to reject
constructive eviction and Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (tending to reject
constructive eviction), with Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978) (tending
to apply constructive eviction) and Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268
(1969) (tending to apply constructive eviction).
65. See King 495 S.W.2d at 76 (constructive eviction, which requires that tenant abandon
premises within reasonable time, is "based upon a fiction which the implied warranty remedy
discards" in favor of recognizing that the modern lease is a bilateral contract).
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A second possible relationship of constructive eviction to
habitability lies at the other end of the spectrum. Termination for
breach of habitability might be available only pursuant to the con-
structive eviction doctrine. In other words, the tenant can terminate
when the landlord's failure to perform his habitability duties has
constructively evicted the tenant. New Jersey" and Pennsylvania67
have adopted this approach. There are ample precedents for this use
of constructive eviction. For almost a century, breaches of express
covenants to repair have been remedied under the rubric of construc-
tive eviction. 8
Use of constructive eviction in this fashion probably should result
in the same substantiality requirement as contract law would impose
under the substantial performance doctrine.69 One element of con-
structive eviction is substantial interference by the landlord with the
tenant's right to possession and enjoyment of the premises. Con-
structive eviction, however, may impose other hurdles for the tenant
that are not present under substantial performance. First, tradi-
tionally the constructive eviction doctrine has required that the te-
nant vacate the premises within a reasonable time after the
landlord's breach becomes evident."0 Failure by the tenant to vacate
in a timely manner constitutes a waiver of the right to rely on con-
66. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The court stated:
- It is eminently fair and just to charge a landlord with the duty of warranting that
a building or part thereof rented for residential purposes is fit for that purpose at
the inception of the term and will remain so during the entire term. Of course, an-
cillary to such understanding it must be implied that he has further agreed to repair
damage to vital facilities caused by ordinary wear and tear during said term ....
Failure to so maintain the property would constitute a constructive eviction ....
Our courts have on a case by case basis held various lease covenants and
covenants to pay rent as dependent and, under the guise of a constructive eviction
have considered breach of the former as giving the right to the tenant to remove
from the premises and terminate his obligation to pay rent.
It is of little comfort to a tenant in these days of housing shortage to accord him
the right, upon constructive eviction, to vacate the premises and end his obligation
to pay rent. Rather he should be accorded the alternative remedy of terminating the
cause of the constructive eviction where as here the cause is the failure to make
reasonable repairs.
Id. at 144-45, 265 A.2d at 534-35 (citations omitted).
67. See Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405
A.2d 897 (1979).
68. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51, at 281-82 (1952); Glendon, supra note 1, at
512-14; Love, supra note 20, at 34-37.
69. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.12 at 590-96 (1982) (if one party's performance is a
constructive condition of the other party's duty to perform, only substantial performance is
required of the first party before he can recover under the contract).
70. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51, at 282 (1952).
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structive eviction. This abandonment requirement has tended to be
enforced rigidly, regardless of the tenant's actual intent to waive his
claim. If constructive eviction is rejected and substantial perform-
ance is used for habitability cases, waiver by the tenant is still
possible-obviously, waiver rules are a viable part of contract law.
Nevertheless, it would seem that a finding of waiver will be less likely
if substantial performance rather than constructive eviction is used.
Waiver under contract law would be a question of fact, adjudicated
on a case by case basis. Under traditional constructive eviction law,
waiver occurs automatically, as a matter of law, after the passage of
a reasonable time following breach of the covenant.
Both the contract doctrine of substantial performance and con-
structive eviction require abandonment by the tenant in order to
terminate the lease. However, there may be a difference between the
two doctrines in the timing of the requirement of abandonment. For
constructive eviction, it is fairly well settled that abandonment is a
prerequisite to the tenant's assertion that the lease has terminated. In
other words, abandonment is a precondition to making the election
to terminate. Under contract law, there seems to be no reason why
the tenant could not prospectively terminate the lease by notifying
the landlord, while the tenant is still in possession and a breach of
the warranty of habitability exists, that the lease is terminated as of a
specified date in the future. Because the tenant must make plans to
"cover" by relocating to new premises, the value of being able to use
such a notice is obvious.
A third possible relationship between habitability and constructive
eviction is that both continue on parallel tracks. Constructive evic-
tion is not replaced by the contract remedy of substantial perform-
ance, and either remains available at the election of the tenant.'
71. Language in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), sug-
gests this possibility:
To alleviate the tenant's burden, the courts broadened the scope of the long-
recognized implied covenant of quiet enjoyment (apparently designed originally to
protect the tenant against ouster by a title superior to that of his lessor) to include
the right of the tenant to have the beneficial enjoyment and use of the premises for
the agreed term. It was but a short step then to the rule that when the landlord or so-
meone acting for him or by virtue of a right acquired through him causes a substan-
tial interference with that enjoyment and use, the tenant may claim a constructive
eviction. In our view, therefore, at the present time whenever a tenant's right to
vacate leased premises comes into existence because he is deprived of their beneficial
enjoyment and use on account of acts chargeable to the landlord, it is immaterial
whether the right is expressed in terms of breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment,
or material failure of consideration, or material breach of an implied warranty
against latent defects.
Id. at 460-61, 251 A.2d at 276-77.
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Here, in most cases either doctrine will justify termination by the te-
nant for breach of habitability. As indicated above, in some jurisdic-
tions substantial performance may give the tenant broader termina-
tion rights because of the abandonment requirement for constructive
eviction.
3. Specific Performance
No reported cases have reached a holding on the question of
whether the tenant has the right to specific performance of the duty
to provide habitable housing.72 Under contract law specific perform-
ance is generally considered to be extraordinary relief that is
available only when legal remedies are shown to be inadequate. A
strict application of the contract theory of habitability would condi-
tion specific performance, or injunctive relief, upon some such
showing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed this route in
Pugh v. Holmes, 3 stating that specific performance would be
available as an equitable remedy only in "unique situations." This
limitation is quite similar to the Uniform Commercial Code rule,
which permits specific performance "where the goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances." 74
In departure from the normal contract law limitations, there is
some authority for broader use of specific performance. In a foot-
note in the Javins opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
"In extending all contract remedies for breach to the parties to a
lease, we include an action for specific performance of the landlord's
implied warranty of habitability." 75 This language suggests that
specific performance will generally be available, but perhaps could
be read to mean only that specific performance is to be granted sub-
ject to the normal contract rules for that type of relief. The URLTA
expressly authorizes injunctive relief for "any noncompliance" with
72. Dicta in a number of decisions support a tenant right to specific performance of the
habitability obligation. E.g., South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89, 361
N.E.2d 795 (1977) (reversing trial court's summary dismissal of tenant's counterclaim seeking
equitable relief of specific performance); Bartley v. Walentos, 78 A.D.2d 310, 434 N.Y.S.2d
379 (1980) (refusing injunctive relief, but indicating that it may sometimes be required to
restrain continuation of breach of warranty of habitability); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super.
76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979) (specific performance is
available as an equitable remedy, limited to unique situations); cf. L & M Inv. Co. v. Mor-
rison, 44 Or. App. 309, 605 P.2d 1347 (1980) (vacating trial court order that landlord bring the
premises into compliance with the City of Portland Housing Code because such code was not
part of Oregon statutory habitability requirement).
73. 486 Pa. 272, 295, 405 A.2d 897, 908 (1979).
74. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1978).
75. 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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the landlord's statutory warranty of habitability.76 The Restatement
does not take any position on when injunctive relief is appropriate.
Analytical confusion can result when the traditional rules for
specific performance are applied to the habitability duty. Contract
law has long treated a breach of a contract to sell real property dif-
ferently than breaches of other contracts, including contracts to sell
personal property. English common law considered each tract of
land to be unique with the result that specific performance was freely
dispensed for contracts for the sale of realty.7 American courts have
generally applied this principle as a per se rule, despite the fact that
today many interests in land can readily be perceived as fungible.78
At early common law, a lease was treated as personalty," so unques-
tionably any promise made by a lessor in connection with a lease
would not fall under the special realty rule for specific performance.
Presently, of course, leases are treated as real property for many
purposes, and almost all courts would specifically enforce a promise
by a lessor to make a lease."0 In so doing, courts stress the convey-
ancing character of the lease transaction and view such a promise as
equivalent to a promise to sell an interest in real property.
A categorization problem arises when applying the realty-
76. "Except as provided in this Act, the tenant may recover actual damages and obtain
injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or Section
2.104 [setting forth statutory habitability obligations] .... " UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
TENANT ACT § 4.101(b) (1972); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1361(B) (1974); IDAHO
CODE § 6-320 (1979) (authorizing action for specific performance when landlord fails to pro-
vide essential services or maintains premises in manner adversely affecting health and safety of
tenant); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 125.536(1) (West 1986) (authorizing injunctive relief when
defective condition constitutes continuing interference with tenant's use and occupancy);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.25(a) (West 1986) (empowering appropriate court to require lessor to
remedy defective conditions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-406(b)(2) (1985) (sanctions injunctive
relief for any material noncompliance with rental agreement or statutory warranty of
habitability); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118 A.350(c) (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-27(B) (1978);
OR. REV. STAT. § 91.800(2) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-6 (1983); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.056(b)(1) (Vernon 1984) (tenant may obtain judicial order directing landlord
to take reasonable action to repair or remedy habitability defect).
77. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.68, at 173 (1952) (contract to convey land or any
interest therein is specifically enforceable by purchaser or vendor); A. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 12.6, at 829 (1982).
78. For a recent rejection of the traditional rule, as applied to the sale of condominiums,
see Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 128 N.J. Super. 385, 320 A.2d 194 (1974).
79. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.1, 3.12, at 205 (1952). Subsequent developments
during the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries changed the lessee's status from the holder of
contractual rights to the owner of an interest in real property for many purposes. See T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 539-43 (4th ed. 1948).
80. Clark & Lewis, Inc. v. Gardner, 91 Fla. 1059, 109 So. 192 (1926); Black v. Milner
Hotels, 194 Ga. 828, 22 S.E.2d 780 (1942); Rigs v. Sokol, 318 Mass. 337, 61 N.E.2d 538
(1945); see I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.17 (1952).
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personalty distinction to the habitability duty. Technically, convey-
ing an interest in the land to the tenant is a separate act from promis-
ing to maintain the premises in a certain condition. That technical
difference, coupled with the judicial emphasis that habitability is a
contract concept, supports the limitation of specific performance to
unique circumstances. This rule, which Pugh adopted, is also but-
tressed by the observation that rental housing units are very often
fungible.I
However, the contrary result-that specific performance is
generally available-can be reached if the lease is seen as an integ-
rated whole, which contains both conveyancing and contract
aspects. When a contract to sell land is specifically enforced, all of
the seller's promises that form a part of that contract are enforced,
not merely the promise to convey.82 Habitability, as part of the
landlord's promise to lease, can be seen in a similar posture. The
habitability covenant is an integral part of the definition of what is
being conveyed. The landlord has promised to convey premises that
are and will remain in a certain condition of repair.
4. Repair-and-Deduct
Five states have judicially recognized the tenant repair-and-deduct
remedy. 3 Ten others have provided a statutory repair-and-deduct
mechanism. 4 Under this remedy, whether judicial or statutory in
81. The court in Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 128 N.J. Super. 385, 393, 320 A.2d 194,
198 (1974), stated:
[A] condominium apartment unit has no unique quality but is one of hundreds of
virtually identical units being offered by a developer for sale to the public. The units
are sold ... [in] much the same manner as items of personal property are sold in the
market place . . . . [lI]n actuality, the condominium apartment units, regardless of
their realty label, show the same characteristics as personal property.
82. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 358(1) (1981):
An order of specific performance or an injunction will be so drawn as best to ef-
fectuate the purposes for which the contract was made and on such terms as justice
requires. It need not be absolute in form and the performance that it requires need
not be identical with that due under the contract.
83. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
265 A.2d 526 (1970); Katurah Corp. v. Wells, 115 Misc. 2d 16, 454 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct.
1982); Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Fair v. Negley, 257
Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978),
aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984);
Birkenhead v. Coombs, 143 Vt. 167, 465 A.2d 244 (1983); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590,
111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); cf. Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 II1. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985) (mentioning
repair-and-deduct as a remedy that is possibly available).
84. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1363(A) (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 (1985); LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2694 (West 1952); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.536(1) (West 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 566.29 (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-406(b) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
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origin, the tenant repairs the premises to bring them into compliance
with the habitability standard and deducts the cost of repairs from
the rent. In order to use the repair-and-deduct remedy the tenant
must first notify the landlord of the breach and give the landlord a
reasonable period of time to cure the breach.8 5
The deduction from rent is limited to the reasonable cost of the
repairs.8" This limitation could be applied in two different circum-
stances. First, if the tenant pays an unrealistically high amount for
materials or repairs, the deduction would be limited to the market
value of the materials or repairs. Second, the nature and extent of
the repairs must be reasonable in light of the age and condition of
the premises. For example, in a low-cost house having all single-pane
windows this rule could limit the rent deduction if the tenant replac-
ed a broken window with the best tempered double-pane window
that is available.
The tenant may make the repairs himself or pay a contractor to
perform the repairs. If the tenant purchases materials and personally
supplies the labor, the question arises whether he can deduct the cost
a contractor would have charged for the entire job. The labor could
be nonreimbursable if the remedial goal behind repair-and-deduct is
perceived to be restricted to covering the tenant's out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Such a rule, however, would appear to be an undue limita-
tion. It would compel knowledgeable tenants to forego undertaking
repairs themselves and always engage an outside contractor. Further,
if a tenant does the work himself, why should the landlord benefit
from free labor? One New York case in effect splits the difference on
the issue by limiting the tenant's deduction to the value of unskilled
labor when the tenant is not engaged in the business of repairing the
particular item involved.87
The remaining term of the lease also limits the repair-and-deduct
remedy. The deduction cannot exceed the total rent due for the re-
118A.360(1) (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-9
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.100 (1986).
85. E.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa.
Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Hilder v. St. Peter,
144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984).
86. Katurah Corp. v. Wells, 115 Misc. 2d 16, 454 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Pugh v.
Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979);
Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984).
87. See Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct.
1970). The court held that the tenant had the right to remove flaking paint from the premises,
which, due to its lead content, constituted a menace to the health and safety of his family, and
to charge the cost to the landlord. The court awarded damages of $45.53, which included the
cost of materials and the labor of the tenant, who was not a painter by trade, at minimum
wage.
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mainder of the term. 8 For a month-to-month tenancy, this can be a
severe restriction. In jurisdictions that have statutorily authorized
repair and deduct, the deduction sometimes is limited to a dollar
maximum or a stated number of months.8 9
Strict adherence to a contract view of habitability probably
militates against adoption of the repair-and-deduct remedy. This ap-
pears to be the thinking behind Teller v. McCoy,"0 in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court summarily rejected repair-and-deduct in
view of "the wide range of contract remedies" it was willing to ex-
tend to tenants in habitability cases. 9 '
In fact, repair-and-deduct appears to be sui generis, with neither it
nor a close substitute commonly recognized by contract law. In the
context of the sale of goods, a repair-and-deduct remedy would in-
volve an election by the buyer to accept nonconforming goods and
make them conform to the contract at the seller's expense. That is
not a choice under the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead, rejec-
tion, cover, and damages are authorized. 92 More generally under
contract law, a failure to perform is not redressed by the promisee's
rendering of performance to himself at the promisor's expense. The
Uniform Commercial Code remedy of cover, 93 under which the
buyer obtains substitute goods from other suppliers and the seller
pays the price differential, is not analogous to repair-and-deduct by
the tenant. Rather, cover closely resembles a tenant's termination of
the lease for a breach of habitability, with the tenant obtaining
substitute housing and the landlord paying any increased rent as
damages.
The repair-and-deduct device can best be equated to a self-help
version of specific performance. Like specific performance, or in-
88. Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405
A.2d 897 (1979).
89. California, Montana, and Washington restrict the amount to one-month's rent. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1942 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-406(b)(1985); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
59.18.100 (1986). Arizona permits the tenant to deduct the greater of $150 or one-half of the
monthly rent to repair defects. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1363(A) (1974). Nevada limits the
tenant's recovery to the greater of $100 or one month's rent, within any 12-month period.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.360(1) (1977). South Dakota requires the tenant to deposit the mon-
thly rental into a bank if the repairs will exceed one month's rental and then notify the
landlord of such action. S.D. CODIFIED LAW ANN. § 43-32-9 (1983). The deposited funds can be
used only to repair the premises. In Louisiana, the tenant is limited only by a "just and
reasonable" amount to make "indispensable" repairs. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (West
1952). North Dakota seems to place no limit on the amount a tenant may spend to repair
defective premises. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1978).
90. 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978).
91. Id. at 386-87, 253 S.E.2d at 126.
92. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 (1)(a), -712(1),(2) (1978).
93. Id. § 2-712.
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junctive relief, its goal is to make the premises habitable rather than
to compensate the tenant for living in uninhabitable premises. The
attractiveness of repair-and-deduct lies in its ease of implementation.
Given the relatively small sums typically involved in residential lease
disputes and the high cost of legal representation, any habitability
remedy that can be asserted only by bringing judicial action against
the landlord is doomed to nonuse. Repair-and-deduct can be
asserted extrajudicially by a tenant, who then only faces legal ex-
pense if and when a landlord takes the initiative to commence litiga-
tion. Despite these advantages, equating repair-and-deduct to
specific performance would tend to limit the remedy to situations in
which damages are an inadequate remedy.
One other contract doctrine that has made recent inroads in the
law of leases should be mentioned here. Courts have recently im-
posed a duty to mitigate damages upon a landlord who claims rent
after the tenant has abandoned possession of the premises.94 This
duty to mitigate, by requiring the landlord to make reasonable ef-
forts to relet the premises, has replaced the landlord's common law
right to refuse to accept the tenant's surrender, let the premises stand
vacant and collect all rent due for the remainder of the lease term. 95
The application of the mitigation principle to habitability would
make repair-and-deduct the tenant's sole remedy under certain cir-
cumstances. When the damage to the tenant from the breach of
habitability is substantially greater than the cost of repairs and that
cost is within the tenant's economic means, the tenant is obligated to
make the repairs in order to minimize his damages. No cases have yet
applied mitigation to the residential tenant's claim of breach of the
warranty of habitability, but the Restatement, with slightly different
operative language, recognizes such a duty as a general part of
96landlord-tenant law.
94. See supra note 4.
95. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.99 (1952) (describing traditional common-law
rule).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 comment i (1976) states:
"The tenant must take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses. His recovery will be limited to
the damages which would have been incurred by a tenant who took all reasonable means to
mitigate his losses." See 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1404, at 563.
One recent case involving a commercial lease required that the lessee, who had rented
premises for a grocery store, mitigate the damages from the lessor's breach of a covenant to
repair the roof. Sigsbee v. Swathwood, 419 N.E.2d 789, 798 (Ind. App. 1981). The roof had
leaked periodically for over two years, with the lessor making several largely unsuccessful ef-
forts at patching, while the lessee remained in possession. The court remanded for a redeter-
mination of damages, stating: "[W]here the repair cost is slight with respect to the decrease in
the value of the 'bargained for' premises, the amount recoverable by the lessee is limited to the
cost of repair." Id. at 798 (relying upon S. WILLISTON, supra).
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By a process of inverse reasoning, the duty to mitigate can provide
a contractual justification for recognition of a tenant's right to
repair-and-deduct. Contract law favors mitigation for reasons of ef-
ficiency. The total cost flowing from a breach of contract is minim-
ized if damage rules are structured to provide an economic incentive
for the nonbreaching party to minimize his losses. When it is clear
that the landlord will not readily make fairly inexpensive repairs, ef-
ficiency supports allocating that responsibility to the tenant.
Naturally, along with that duty to mitigate comes the right to do so.
5. Rent Withholding/Rent Abatement/Rent Escrow
In discussing remedies for breach of the duty of habitability,
courts 97 and commentators98 often discuss whether the tenant should
have the right to withhold or abate rent or pay rent into escrow. The
URLTA addresses this as well, using similar terminology.99
However, these are not substantive remedies that are different from
or in addition to the remedies of damages, specific performance, and
repair-and-deduct discussed above. Rather, courts and comment-
ators typically refer to these tenant actions when discussing what
procedures the tenant may follow to claim damages or to apply his
rent to the repair costs. Generally, rent withholding and rent abate-
ment convey the idea that habitability and rent are dependent
covenants. If the tenant has the right to withhold or abate rent, then
after a decision on the merits of the habitability dispute the landlord
will be able to collect all the accrued rent less the damages caused by
the breach. Some courts refer to those damages as the amount of
abated rent.' 0
Similarly, rent escrow is a procedural device designed to protect
both parties from the insolvency of the other pending a determina-
97. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes,
253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979).
98. E.g., Cunningham, supra note 11, at 113-14; Glendon, supra note 1, at 532; Abbott,
supra note 38, at 58-59.
99. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT AcT § 4.105(a) (1972) states:
In an action for possession based upon nonpayment of the rent or in an action (or
rent when the tenant is in possession, the tenant may counterclaim for any amount
he may recover under the rental agreement or this Act. In that event the court from
time to time may order the tenant to pay into the court all or part of the rent ac-
crued and thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due to each party
100. E.g., Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 Ill. 2d 1,479 N.E.2d 915 (1985); 111 East 88th Partners
v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 434 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa.
Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979).
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tion of the habitability issues. 101 If the rent is escrowed with the court
or some other person, part or all of it may be refunded to the tenant
to the extent damages from the breach are proven. The landlord may
then collect the remainder, if any, of the escrowed amounts as pro-
perly payable rent.
Rent withholding or rent escrow can also be used to facilitate the
making of repairs by the landlord, the tenant, or a third party. If the
court orders specific performance or sanctions a tenant's repair ef-
forts, rent that is withheld or escrowed may be paid to the person
who makes the repairs. 102
IV. RECENT TORT INROADS ON HABITABILITY
As discussed above, the warranty of habitability was conceived of
as and has overwhelmingly remained a creature of contract. Never-
theless, there are several recent cases which stand at a crosscurrent to
the contract orientation and therefore merit careful attention.
Courts in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon have recognized
that a landlord's breach of the duty of habitability can give rise to
tort liability even in the absence of physical injury. Although few in
number and somewhat restrictive in their holdings, these decisions
may stand as a harbinger of the advance of tort into the land of
habitability.
A. California: Stoiber v. Honeychuck
In Stoiber v. Honeychuck,1°1 a tenant brought a damage action
against her former landlord for the failure to correct numerous
habitability defects, most of which related to plumbing, electrical,
and structural difficulties. After 34 months of occupancy, the tenant
vacated the premises pursuant to an order of condemnation from the
county health department. The tenant alleged damages under five
separate causes of action: implied warranty of habitability, nuisance,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent violation of a
statutory habitability duty, and constructive eviction.' 0 4 She sought
101. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n.67 (applauding payment of rent into registry of court
pending conclusion of habitability litigation as "excellent protective procedure").
102. See S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-9 (1983) (authorizing tenant to withhold rent
and deposit same in bank account to provide a fund for the making of necessary repairs
costing more than one month's rent, with payment to whichever party makes repairs).
103. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
104. Id. at 911, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 196. Although no longer in possession, the tenant also
sought to enjoin the landlord's continued rental of substandard housing units as an "unfair or
fraudulent business practice" under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE. § 17200 (West 1964). The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of injunctive relief on the ground that the tenant
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damages of $20 per day for discomfort and annoyance for the entire
term, $10,000 in punitive damages, and an unspecified amount for
water damage to her personal property."0 5 The trial court dismissed
the tort and constructive eviction causes of action on the theory that
the warranty of habitability constituted the tenant's exclusive
damage remedy. 1 6 Evidently, all or most of her claimed damages
would not have been cognizable in a contract action based on an im-
plied warranty of habitability. In that type of action, California law
would have awarded her the difference between the fair rental value
of the premises as warranted and the fair rental in their defective
condition."0 7
The court of appeals reversed and held that all three tort causes of
action, as well as constructive eviction, were properly pleaded by the
tenant's complaint.'10 The court held that the availability of a con-
tractual habitability action did not preclude a tort action.' 9 If the
facts that give rise to a breach of the warranty of habitability in-
dependently satisfy the elements of one or more tort causes of ac-
tion, the tenant can elect whichever cause of action offers the
superior remedies. The only limitation that the court imposed is the
obvious rule that a plaintiff having multiple causes of action can on-
ly recover once for an injury."10
Looking at prior California law, Stoiber appears to stand on solid
ground. In the leading case of Green v. Superior Court,"' the
California Supreme Court implied a common-law warranty of
habitability in the face of a broadly worded statutory warranty of
habitability." 2 The statute expressly provided two tenant remedies:
lacked standing, no longer being an occupant of any of defendant's properties. Had it reached.
the merits, the court also suggested that it might have denied an injunction under the unfair
business practices statute because of the adequacy of the tenant's other remedies, including in-
junctive relief under nuisance. Id. at 928, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
105. Id. at 913, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
106. Id. at 911, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
107. See infra note 115. The Stoiber court and the parties assumed that mental distress
damages and injury to the tenant's personal property are not recoverable in an action for
breach of implied warranty. A 1977 court of appeal of the superior court decision denied
damages for discomfort and annoyance in such an action. Quevedo v. Braga, 72 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1977). Conceivably, if Quevedo is incorrect, such damages could
be awarded as consequential damages foreseeably caused by the landlord's breach. The
supreme court did not negate this possibility in Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517
P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
108. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 931-32, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
109. Id. at 929-30, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
110. Id. at 931-32, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
111. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
112. Id. at 629-31, 517 P.2d at 1169-70, II Cal. Rptr. at 712-14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941
(West 1985), enacted in 1872, requires that lessors of residential property, in the absence of a
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repair-and-deduct, and the right to abandon."1 3 The Green court
found the statutory framework was not intended by the legislature to
exclude the judicial common-law fashioning of other tenant rights
and remedies.I" On that basis, the court recognized rent abatement
as a tenant remedy under the implied warranty."l' The Stoiber court
merely followed the process of remedial expansion started by Green
in this area. There is no indication in the California case law that
growth in the common law of the landlord-tenant relationship has to
stop with the contractual habitability doctrine.
One potential obstacle to tort remedies for a breach of the warran-
ty of habitability is the old doctrine of landlord immunity from tort
liability for injuries occurring on the leased premises." l, In states
where this doctrine has retained some degree of vitality, courts might
hold that tort remedies for breach of habitability are inappropriate.
In California, however, cases decided several years prior to Stoiber
removed this roadblock by holding that landlords owe their tenants a
duty of care under the usual standards of reasonableness.' 17
After deciding that the tenant generally could sue in tort for
breach of the duty of habitability, the court in Stoiber discussed each
of the four alternative causes of action that would allow damages for
physical discomfort and mental annoyance-nuisance, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent violation of a statutory
duty, and constructive eviction. Finding nuisance applicable, the
contrary agreement, maintain it in fit condition and repair all dilapidations "which render it
untenantable."
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.
114. 10 Cal. 3d at 629-31, 517 P.2d at 1169-70, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712-14. Cases prior to
Green had held that the two statutory remedies constituted the sole procedure for enforcing
the lessor's statutory habitability duties. E.g., Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563, 566 (1881).
These cases foreclosed the option of implying new remedies to secure the tenants' statutory
rights, making necessary the recognition of a common-law implied warranty of habitability.
115. 10 Cal. 3d at 629-31, 517 P.2d at 1169-70, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712-14. Under Green, the
amount of rent abatement is equal to the damages caused by the landlord's breach. Relying on
cases from other jurisdictions, the court equated the damage to "the difference between the
fair rental value of the premises if they had been as warranted and the fair rental value of the
premises as they were during occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe or unsanitary condition."
Id. at 638, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (quoting Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,
797 (Iowa 1972)).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
117. Evans v. Thomason, 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1977); Brennan v.
Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973). Rejection of the tradi-
tional doctrine of landlord immunity was based upon a statute providing:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985). See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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court indicated that damages for discomfort and annoyance would
be recoverable." 8 Exemplary damages would also lie, provided the
nuisance was intentional, rather than negligent." 9
The use of nuisance in habitability cases is novel and intriguing.
Nuisance protects the owner of an interest in land from the activities
of other persons that cause substantial and unreasonable injury.12
Historically, nuisance protected the ownership of land when trespass
did not lie due to the absence of a tangible physical invasion.
Clearly, as the court notes, a tenant's interest in the leased premises
is a sufficient property right to be safeguarded by nuisance law.' 2 ' A
substantial body of precedent allows a tenant relief in nuisance when
adjoining landowners interfere with the tenant's possessory rights. 22
On the surface, Stoiber's use of nuisance comports with standard
hornbook law: defendant-landlord, by breaching the duty of
habitability, substantially and unreasonably interferes with the te-
nant's right to possession. Beneath the surface, Stoiber expands
nuisance in two directions. First, nuisance liability traditionally has
applied to the affirmative conduct of a defendant. Here, there is no
affirmative act by the landlord that interferes with the tenant's prop-
erty. Rather, there is only a failure to act and make repairs. In the
past, courts have not utilized nuisance to impose liability upon per-
sons who have an affirmative duty to protect the property of others.
Basing nuisance solely upon a defendant's omission breaks new
ground."'
118. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 919-20, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02. The court indicated that affirm-
ative defenses traditionally recognized in tort law, such as consent, contributory negligence,
and assumption of the risk, could be raised by the landlord, not only for nuisance but also for
the tenant's negligence action. Id. at 920-21, 925, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202, 205. Justice Brown's
concurring opinion makes the same point more strongly. Id. at 932-33, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
209-10.
119. Id. at 920, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202. Nuisance typically is classified according to the
defendant's intent. It is an intentional tort if the defendant knew of the harm caused by his ac-
tivities. In the absence of that intent, recovery in nuisance is justified if the defendant's con-
duct negligently caused unreasonable and substantial injury to the property of others. In some
cases in the absence of intent to cause harm or negligence, nuisance liability has been
predicated upon strict liability when the defendant engaged in ultrahazardous activities. See
6-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.24 (1952).
120. In California, nuisance is defined by statute as: "[alnything which is injurious to
health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property ..... CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3479 (West 1970). As related to property, the statutory definition is sufficiently broad and
vague to permit the California courts the same latitude in shaping nuisance law as enjoyed by
other courts that look solely to common law.
121. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
122. See 6-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.31 (1952).
123. The court relies on Prosser for the proposition that the defendant's omission, rather
than affirmative conduct, can constitute a nuisance. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
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The second innovation is a corollary of the first. Nuisance, as a
branch of property law, defines a duty that the whole world owes to
the landowner. Anyone can breach this duty by interfering with or
diminishing the plaintiff's enjoyment of his property. Labeling a
breach of the duty to provide habitable premises as a nuisance
changes the nature of nuisance as a common-law property action. In
this instance, nuisance lies for the breach of a duty that is not owed
by everyone, but only by the landlord. Rather than defining the
plaintiff's rights against the world, as does traditional common-law
nuisance, nuisance as a cause of action for breach of the duty to pro-
vide habitable premises only defines the plaintiff's rights against a
limited class of persons-landlords.'I"
Stoiber's expansion of nuisance can be examined on at least two
levels. The immediate question is whether a tenant nuisance action
for breach of the duty of habitability is justified. Resolution of this
question should turn on a comparison of nuisance remedies with
those afforded in a contract action for breach of habitability. Unless
nuisance offers broader remedies than the contract action, this issue,
although interesting theoretically, is of no practical importance. This
comparison will differ jurisdiction by jurisdiction. Generally,
nuisance may permit damages for discomfort and annoyance and of-
fer injunctive relief in situations not permitted in a contract
action. 2 ' Also, exemplary damages may be available in nuisance
when they would be precluded in a contract action.
At another level, the broad view of nuisance espoused by Stoiber
may have ramifications beyond the context of habitability. Virtually
any material breach by a landlord of his obligations under the lease
can fit the definition of nuisance as a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the tenant's property rights. Whether a tenant
should generally have a tort action in nuisance to remedy breaches
by the landlord is a fairly broad question. Actually, the core issue is
202 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS § 87, at 575-77 (4th ed. 1971)). Prosser does state that a
defendant's failure to inspect and repair his premises may be actionable in nuisance; however,
the cases he cites indicate that the basis for liability is the failure to conduct an activity with
due care by, for example, repairing equipment. E.g., Schindler v. Standard Oil Co., 207 Mo.
App. 190, 232 S.W. 735 (1921) (leaking water pipe).
124. A case relied upon by Stoiber illustrates the contrast between affirmative conduct and
mere omission. In Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251, 280 P. 942 (1929), the tenants successfully
brought an action in nuisance against their landlord for cutting off the tenants' water supply.
Because the landlord's acts were not authorized by the lease, the landlord had the same liabil-
ity to the tenants as would any third party who interfered with the tenants' water. Id. at 255,
280 P. at 943. In this type of case, nuisance prohibits the landlord from doing to the tenant
what no third party could do to the tenant i.e., nuisance defines the tenant's property in the
classic sense of an interest protected against all who might take or destroy it.
125. See supra note 107.
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even broader. A landlord undoubtedly has an interest in real prop-
erty, both in his reversion and in the rents. Should a landlord
therefore have a nuisance action for a material breach by a tenant on
the theory that his property rights are substantially and unreasonably
injured? Indeed, should the breach of any promise that is related to
real property constitute the tort of nuisance?
Intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlike nuisance, does
not depend upon the tenant's ownership of a property interest.
Stoiber defines the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as: "(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention
to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional
distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate
causation of emotional distress."' 26 California, like a growing
number of other states, allows recovery for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress without physical injury.'27 In Stoiber, the court
held that whether the landlord acted outrageously and whether the
tenant suffered severe mental distress were factual questions.' 28
Arguably, a landlord's intentional failure to repair habitability
defects that threaten the tenant's health or safety could be con-
sidered outrageous per se, but the court did not choose to go this far.
Under this cause of action, exemplary damages as well as compensa-
tion for mental distress are recoverable. If nuisance is also available,
however, that avenue is preferable for the tenant. The same damages
are recoverable, according to Stoiber, and in nuisance there is no
need to prove that the defendant's breach was "outrageous" or that
the distress was "severe."' 29 If nuisance is available for habitability
cases, intentional infliction of emotional distress is superfluous.
The third tort action sanctioned by Stoiber is negligent violation
of a statutory duty.' 30 In California, a statute requires that a lessor
of residential premises maintain the premises in fit condition and
repair all dilapidations that "render it untenantable."' 3 ' California
housing codes also supply standards for habitable housing. The
court in Stoiber held that a landlord's violation of these statutory
duties gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence.' 32 Proof
126. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202. This is a standard definition. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1964).
127. State Rubbish Collections Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);
Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1971). After Stoiber, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court extended recovery to negligently inflicted emotional harm. See infra note
135.
128. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
129. Id. at 920, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
130. Id. at 922, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1985).
132. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05.
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that "the landlord did what might reasonably be expected of a per-
son of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who
desired to comply with the law" would rebut this presumption.' 33
The relief available for negligent violation of a statutory
habitability duty includes damages for discomfort and annoyance
and for injury to the tenant's personal property. To reach this result,
the court relied upon the California rule that negligent infliction of
emotional distress is compensable without physical injury when the
defendant tortiously interferes with property."' This special rule,
which substitutes harm to property for physical injury as a prerequis-
ite for mental distress damages, is no longer necessary in California.
Several months after Stoiber, the California Supreme Court, in
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, I3 decided that plaintiffs can
recover for pure emotional harm in negligence cases.
The relationship of this negligence action to the intentional torts
of infliction of emotional distress and nuisance is far from clear. The
negligence action, while presenting substantially fewer hurdles for
the plaintiff than intentional infliction of emotional distress, appears
to offer the same relief with the exception that exemplary damages
generally are not recoverable in negligence. Thus, the intentional tort
is unnecessary whenever the landlord's failure to repair is statutory
and the tenant does not seek exemplary damages. As to nuisance, it
is often said that this tort may be founded on the defendant's intent
or upon his negligence.' 36 With the court's emphasis on the negligent
interference with the tenant's property rights, perhaps the action for
negligent violation of statutory duty essentially is nuisance. Then the
landlord need not have intended to cause a nuisance; negligence suf-
fices. The statute gives the tenant the benefit of a presumption of
negligence. Perhaps it might also make the landlord's failure to
repair a species of nuisance per se.
The last damage cause of action discussed by the Stoiber court is
constructive eviction. 37 Under this action, the tenant can recover
damages for the benefit of her bargain, measured by the same for-
mula used for contract damages for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. Moving expenses to new premises are also
recoverable.' 38 Under California law, a wrongfully evicted tenant
can elect to sue in tort. With this election, the Stoiber court indicated
133. Id. at 924-25, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
134. Id. at 922, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967)).
135. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
136. See, e.g., Stoiber, 101 Cal. App. at 920, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
137. Id. at 925, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
138. Id. at 925-26, 162 Cal, Rptr. at 205-06.
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that the tenant could recover an award for mental anguish and pain,
as well as, when justified by the landlord's conduct, exemplary
damages.' 39
B. Massachusetts: Simon v. Solomon
In Simon v. Solomon,'" the tenant's basement was flooded with
water and sewage a number of times over a period of almost four
years. Each time the landlord pumped out the water, but never rec-
tified the plumbing and foundation defects that caused the flooding.
Three years after the tenancy began, the landlord sued to evict the te-
nant for nonpayment of rent. Citing the floods and other defects,
the tenant denied that rent was owed and counterclaimed for
damages on four separate counts: (1) breach of implied warranty of
habitability, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3)
breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (4) negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.''
The trial judge granted summary judgment for the landlord on the
negligence count, ruling that emotional harm unaccompanied by
physical injury was not compensable under Massachusetts law."4 2
The jury returned verdicts for the tenant on the other three counts:
$1000 for breach of the warranty of habitability, $10,000 for breach
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and $35,000 for the intentional
or reckless infliction of emotional distress.""
On appeal, the supreme judicial court affirmed the tenant's judg-
ment for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defining the tort
139. Id. For the tenant's election to sue in tort, the court cites 42 CAL. JUR. 3d § 132, at
156-57 (1978). The leading case cited by that encyclopedia is Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950), in which a tenant suffered a miscarriage after the landlord
wrongfully evicted her from her apartment. The court permitted the tenant to waive the breach
of contract and sue for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 129, 217 P.2d at
117. Richardson does not suggest that the wrongful eviction provided an independent basis for
tort liability. In Stoiber, however, the tenant was claiming mental distress damages under both
constructive eviction and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, as independent causes
of action. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 921-22, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202-03. Unless the Stoiber court
intended to expand a tenant's rights under constructive eviction, it erred by holding that men-
tal distress damages were properly pleaded under constructive eviction when the tenant was
simultaneously proceeding under the intentional tort theory. Id. at 926, Cal. Rptr. at 206.
140. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982).
141. Id. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560-61.
142. Id.
143. Id. The jury found that the landlord acted outrageously and, although not intending
to cause emotional distress, knew or should have known that his conduct would accomplish
that result. Id. at 94 n.2, 431 N.E.2d at 560 n.2. Psychiatric testimony supported the tenant's
claim that she had suffered from severe depression as a result of her flooded apartment and
was in need of substantial psychiatric treatment. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560.
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by reference to the same four elements identified by the California
court in Stoiber.l1" The landlord's principal contention on appeal
focused on causation. The landlord argued that the tenant had not
identified a specific defect that, if repaired, would have stopped the
flooding, and that abuse of the building's plumbing system by other
tenants probably caused the problem. "5 Conceding this uncertainty,
the supreme judicial court still found ample evidence in the record
that the landlord failed to exercise reasonable care in investigating
and solving the flooding problem, and that this failure proximately
caused the tenant's emotional harm.'4 6
The tenant's claim for interference with quiet enjoyment was
based upon a statute providing in part that "any lessor or landlord
who directly or indirectly interferes with the quiet enjoyment of any
residential premises by the occupant . . .[shall] be liable for actual
and consequential damages or three months rent, whichever is
greater, and the costs of action, including a reasonable attorney's
fee ... ,,"'4 The court does not mention constructive eviction.
Essentially, however, this statute codifies a constructive eviction ac-
tion, eliminating the common-law requirement that the tenant must
abandon the premises within a reasonable time period to avoid a
waiver of his rights. Under Massachusetts common law, an action
for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment was contractual in
nature, and the usual measure of damages was the loss of rental
value. ,48 The Simon court stated that the statutory term "actual and
consequential damages" has a broader meaning and includes
damages for all reasonably foreseeable personal injuries caused by
the breach, including mental distress.' 4 9 Because of this broad view
144. Id. at 95, 431 N.E.2d at 561-62. See supra text accompanying note 126.
145. 385 Mass. at 95-96, 431 N.E.2d at 561.
146. Id. at 96-97, 431 N.E.2d at 562.
147. Id. at 99, 431 N.E.2d at 563; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1985).
148. See Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979);
Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959).
149. 385 Mass. at 112, 431 N.E.2d at 570. The court states that recovery of damages under
§ 14 does not depend upon any specific intent of the landlord to interfere with the tenant's
quiet enjoyment. The statute as a whole is poorly drafted. The first part of § 14 imposes the
same liability for actual or consequential damages or three months' rent on a landlord who
"willfully or intentionally" fails to provide essential services that he is obligated to furnish.
Until 1973 the clause prohibiting interference with quiet enjoyment was also limited to willfull
or intentional conduct of the landlord. A 1973 rewriting of § 14 dropped the intent require-
ment from this clause, retaining it in the clause relating to essential services. With this textual
justification, the Simon court concluded that the legislature wanted no intent requirement for
quiet enjoyment actions under § 14. Id. at 101-02, 431 N.E.2d at 564. Perhaps so, but the
result is that the first part of the statute dealing with essential services is now superfluous. Any
tenant whose essential services are interrupted can avoid the intent requirement by claiming
that the interruption also interferes with quiet enjoyment. This strategy should succeed; for a
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of the damages recoverable in quiet enjoyment, in Massachusetts the
use of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress appears
unnecessary in habitability cases. In Massachusetts, quiet enjoyment
provides for damages for emotional distress without the requirement
that the landlord's conduct be outrageous or that the harm meet a
threshold of severity.
After recognizing that a cause of action for quiet enjoyment exists
for breach of the duty of habitability, the Simon court vacated the
$10,000 judgment for interference with quiet enjoyment because it
duplicated damages separately awarded for intentional infliction of
emotional distress ($35,000) and for loss of rental value under breach
of warranty ($1000).15°
The court in Simon affirmed the summary judgment dismissing
the tenant's cause of action for negligent failure to maintain the
premises. The fenant requested that the court join the small number
of jurisdictions that recently have permitted the victims of negligence
to recover for emotional harm in the absence of physical injury.
Alternatively, she argued for the imposition of strict liability upon
landlords for injuries caused by breaches of the duty of habitability,
including emotional injuries. The court declined to sanction either
theory, citing the established Massachusetts rule that purely emo-
tional harm is noncompensable in negligence,' 5 and mentioning that
the tenant apparently recovered the entirety of her emotional distress
damage under the intentional tort theory.52
C. Oregon: Brewer v. Erwin
In Brewer v. Erwin, " ' a month-to-month tenant rented the
upstairs apartment of an old, deteriorating house. The landlord
decided to demolish the house and sent the tenant a 30-day eviction
notice. The tenant refused to vacate, and she soon joined a
neighborhood group dedicated to stopping the demolition of old
homes. The landlord persisted with extralegal efforts to regain
possession. A number of confrontations between the parties ensued,
and the landlord made some vague threats about the consequences
court to deny it would create the anomaly that the landlord's liability is greater when the
breach is other than a failure to provide essential services (e.g., the failure to provide
nonessential services is more heavily penalized if it interferes with quiet enjoyment).
150. Id. at 108-11, 431 N.E.2d at 568-70.
151. Id. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562. The court cited Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978), and McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974).
In a case decided after Simon, the supreme judicial court continued to adhere to this position.
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
152. 385 Mass. at 98-99, 431 N.E.2d at 563.
153. 287 Or. 435, 600 P.2d 398 (1979).
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of the tenant's refusal to leave. Thereafter, the landlord discon-
nected the natural gas to the house and partially demolished the
unoccupied downstairs apartment. 5 4
Eventually, the landlord, resigning himself to the necessity of
litigation, brought an action against the tenant in district court for
forcible entry and detainer. '" Prior to the conclusion of that action,
the tenant commenced a separate action against the landlord in cir-
cuit court to enjoin prosecution of the forcible entry and detainer ac-
tion, for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for
a battery stemming from one of the parties' confrontations, and for
violations of the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act. 5 ' The
circuit court refused the injunction, granted her judgment on a $650
jury verdict for battery, and dismissed all other damage claims. 57
The tenant sought to recover emotional distress damages and
punitive damages both under the Oregon Residential Landlord Te-
nant Act and in an independent tort action. The Oregon Act is based
upon the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, with some local
modifications. The supreme court struggled with the Oregon Act,
finding no clear direction from the statutory language,' 58 which in
various provisions permits the recovery of "damages," "actual
damages," or "appropriate damages."'1" Comments to the Uniform
Act alleviated very little of the confusion.'60 The most charitable
assessment one can make of the statutory treatment of damages is to
observe that the drafters left the door open for judicial innovation.
The Brewer court's holding on statutory damages for emotional
distress is not altogether clear. Procedurally, it reversed the trial
court's ruling that psychic injuries are noncompensable under the
Act. Justice Linde, writing for the court, identified two variables
that bear on the question: the type of habitability violation and the
willfulness of the landlord's violation.'.' The Act defines certain
154. Id. at 436-37, 600 P.2d at 401.
155. A judgment awarding the landlord possession was affirmed in Marquam Inv. Corp.
v. Brewer, 40 Or. App. 175, 594 P.2d 1327 (1979).
156. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.700-.935 (1985).
157. 287 Or. at 436, 600 P.2d at 402.
158. Id. at 437, 600 P.2d at 402-03.
159. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.725, 91.745, 91.760(9), 91.800(2), 91.815, 91.840(10). The
Act contains a number of specific remedial provisions tailored to certain types of breaches, as
well as the following advisory provision: "The remedies provided by [the Act) shall be so ad-
ministered that an aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages. The aggrieved party has
a duty to mitigate damages." Id. § 91.725.
160. The URLTA comment to the OR. REV. STAT. § 91.725, quoted in supra note 159
states: "[This section] is intended to negate unduly narrow or technical interpretation of
remedial provisions and to make clear that damages must be minimized .... UNIF. RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD TENANT AcT § 1.105(a) comment (1972).
161. 287 Or. at 453,600 P.2d at 409.
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"essential services" that a landlord must provide, such as heat and
water.' 62 The statutory standard for habitability also encompasses
elements other than essential services, such as structural maintenance
and fire safety measures.' 63 For a deliberate failure to provide essen-
tial services, the court stated that a tenant can recover for "actual
psychological harm." 6 At the other end of the spectrum, damages
for mental distress are not recoverable for the landlord's "nonculp-
able or negligent" failure to supply habitable premises. ' What
"deliberate" and "nonculpable" mean are a bit of a mystery. From
the opinion, a deliberate breach appears to be something more than
mere negligence on the part of the landlord, but probably something
less than outrageous conduct. Arguably, any failure to repair a
habitability defect is deliberate or intentional when the landlord has
actual notice of the problem and fails to correct it promptly. The
Brewer court does not explain how a deliberate habitability breach
that does not involve an essential service is to be treated, nor is it
clear whether there is a threshold the tenant must meet to collect for
"actual psychological harm." Another part of the opinion justifies
recovery when a breach causes "tangible consequences such as
physical illness, medical bills, inability to sleep, to eat or work in
one's dwelling, separation of family members or similar disruptions
of one's personal life."' 66 Conceivably, damages for annoyance and
discomfort might not be allowed unless they rise to a level akin to
"severe emotional distress," as that term is employed in the realm of
intentional tort.' 67
The court in Brewer refused to permit punitive damages for a
landlord's violation of the Oregon Act.' 6' The statute generally
authorizes "appropriate damages"' 169  and does not expressly
162. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.815 (1985).
163. Id. § 91.770(1).
164. 287 Or. at 453, 600 P.2d at 409.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 449, 600 P.2d at 407.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27. For an example of the confusion caused
by the Brewer opinion, see L & M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 44 Or. App. 309, 605 P.2d 1347
(1980). Prior to Brewer, the Oregon Court of Appeals had decided that mental distress
damages were not recoverable under the Oregon Act. Ficker v. Diefenbach, 34 Or. App. 241,
578 P.2d 467 (1978). In Morrison, the same court stated: "Although we would normally
assume that our decision in Ficker represents the state of the law on this question, the subse-
quent decision in Brewer ... indicates there may be some doubt on that issue under certain
circumstances, although Ficker was not disapproved." 44 Or. App. at 317-18, 605 P.2d at
1352. The Morrison court did not decide the issue because the landlord failed to raise it on ap-
peal.
168. 287 Or. at 453, 600 P.2d at 409.
169. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.725 (1985).
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preclude punitive damages. For certain specified violations, the Act
permits the tenant to collect two month's rent or twice the actual
damages, whichever is greater.17 0 The court reasoned that the selec-
tive use of this type of provision, which in effect provides for
statutory punitive damages, evinced a legislative intent that addi-
tional punitive damages of an unlimited amount should not be im-
plied. 7 ,
The Brewer tenant also prevailed before the supreme court on her
tort cause of action. Like Stoiber and Simon, the Brewer court
recognized that a tenant may recover damages from the landlord for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress, even in the absence of
physical injury."'7 Brewer, however, departs from the other cases in
its handling of the defendant's intent. Oregon ordinarily requires
that the defendant's actual purpose is to inflict mental suffering on
the plaintiff.'73 In Brewer the tenant's complaint met this standard
because she alleged that the landlord deliberately sought to cause her
enough stress that she would abandon the house. 74 In most
habitability cases, unlike Brewer, the landlord will lack this type of
wrongful intent. Most often, a landlord's deliberate failure to repair
will be motivated by economics rather than the desire to inflict suf-
fering.
The court recognized an exception to the wrongful purpose re-
quirement when there is a relationship between the parties that im-
poses a special obligation upon the defendant. " When such a rela-
tionship exists, the defendant is liable if he recklessly causes emo-
tional distress, even if there is no deliberate intent to cause that
harm. The court referred to physicians, public carriers, and inn-
keepers as types of relationships that trigger this relaxed intent re-
quirement.' 6 Surprisingly, there is no hint at all as to whether the
relationship between a residential landlord and tenant might qualify
for this recklessness standard."
170. E.g., id. §§ 91.745(2) (inclusion of forbidden provisions in lease), 91.760(8) (wrongful
withholding of security deposit), 91.815 (wrongful eviction or wilfull interruption of essential
services).
171. 287 Or. at 443, 600 P.2d at 404.
172. Id. at 457-58, 600 P.2d at 411-12.
173. See Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 279 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (harrassing
debt collection techniques constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress).
174. 287 Or. at 458, 600 P.2d at 412.
175. Id. at 457-58, 600 P.2d at 411-12.
176. Id. at 457, 600 P.2d at 411.
177. The court's statement that an innkeeper is subject to the higher standard would cer-
tainly seem to raise the question whether a residential landlord should be similarly treated. A
modern landlord has obligations that are more akin to those of an innkeeper under English
common law than to a lessor of real property.
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V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: SPLITTING HABITABILITY INTO TORT
AND CONTRACT
A. Tort Damages
Habitability should be separated into two separate and distinct ac-
tions, one a tort action, the other contract, based upon whether the
duty to repair the defect is waivable. When a housing defect
significantly threatens the tenant's health and safety, the great
weight of authority, with ample justification in public policy, con-
siders the duty to repair that defect to be nonwaivable.18 Such a
duty certainly is not contractual in nature because its existence does
not stem from the parties' bargain in fact. There is no reason why a
breach of this duty which is not contractually created should be
redressed by contract remedies when the tenant has not obtained a
protectable expectation through the bargaining process.
Tenant actions based on nonwaivable housing defects should
sound in tort and be remedied solely under tort principles. Under the
rubric of tort, two types of damages potentially would be available:
actual economic loss incurred by the tenant, and noneconomic loss.
The breach of a nonwaivable habitability duty may or may not pro-
duce economic loss. Such loss will result if, when the lease was made,
the parties believed that the premises were habitable or would be
made so; in other words, if an underlying assumption of the bargain-
ing process was that the landlord would obey the law. In this situa-
tion, the application of ordinary tort rules provides the tenant with
the proper compensation. The value of the tenant's property, the
leasehold, has been diminished by the landlord's breach. The
measure of damages for such a tort is the diminution in value of the
plaintiff's property interest, comparing the value of what he bar-
gained for (habitable premises) with the value of what he received.
This is true whether the tort is classified as trespass, nuisance, or
negligence. This measure perfectly compensates the tenant, unlike a
number of the contract measures devised by the courts that often
undercompensate or overcompensate.' 79
Economic loss is not caused by a habitability breach if, when the
lease was made, neither party in fact expected that repairs would be
made. Such an expectation occurs in the prototypical slum lease, in
which the rent is set at a low figure that reflects the dilapidated con-
dition of the housing unit and the surrounding neighborhood. The
tenant receives precisely what he bargained for, even though the
transaction is tainted by illegality. Contract law remedies often suf-
178. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
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fer from the impediment of awarding compensatory damages for
this scenario. I" Recovery for economic loss should not be permitted
here. The tort damage measure of diminution-in-value achieves this
result because the value of the property interest that the tenant
bargained for and the value of the interest that he received are equal.
The primary advantage of treating the breach of a nonwaivable
habitability duty as a tort lies in the use of noneconomic damages.
Indeed, if the slum tenant described above has a private damage ac-
tion, it should clearly be recognized as one for noneconomic
damages such as emotional distress or pain and suffering. By shed-
ding the fetters of contract law, courts would have the opportunity
to address, without obfuscation, the real issue in this type of
case-compensation for noneconomic injury.
The issue of whether a jurisdiction should award noneconomic
damages in tort is not capable of easy resolution. The argument for
such damages could extend to all residential leases, but is strongest
when applied to the slum lease, because the denial of noneconomic
damages will leave the tenant with no damage action at all (assuming
that no award is given for phantom economic loss).
There are two reasons why such damages may be desirable. First,
recognition of noneconomic damage may deter landlords from
breaching their habitability duties. Some statistical studies of
habitability tend to indicate that the new habitability duties are
underenforced and generally have had little impact in the real world,
away from academia.' 1 These studies can be interpreted to provide
empirical support for the need for added deterrence. It can be
hypothesized that, at least in some communities, landlords con-
sciously adopt a policy of not repairing habitability defects. That
policy reflects a rational economic decision if the landlord has con-
cluded that the cost of repairs would exceed the risk that some
tenants might obtain damage judgments. Allowing recovery for
noneconomic damages on a widespread scale would change this
decision-making calculus. 82 The landlord is less likely to breach the
180. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An In-
tegration, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 62-64 (1976); Heskin, The Warranty for Habitability Debate: A
California Case Study, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 37 (1978); Rose & Scott, "Street Talk" Summonses
in Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URBAN
L. 967 (1975).
182. If landlords are liable for noneconomic damages, that liability should extend to all in-
tentional breaches of habitability when the defect is nonwaivable. There should be no indepen-
dent requirement that the landlord has acted "outrageously," as is commonly required for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
It should suffice that the breach is intentional and the defect, because it is nonwaivable,
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duty to provide habitable premises if noneconomic damages are or-
dinarily available, not only because damage awards will be larger,
but also because they will be less predictable, with no easily iden-
tifiable cap on liability.
Two counter-arguments can be made to the argument that added
deterrence justifies noneconomic damages. First, the pat argument
of tort defendants everywhere can be raised-jury awards for items
such as pain and suffering are too variable, unpredictable, and
catastrophically costly.' 3 To the extent that one accepts this
criticism of our present compensation system for personal injuries, it
applies equally to the extension of noneconomic damages to
habitability cases.
The second and more important objection directly challenges the
need for deterrence when, as is often the case, the defect violates a
housing code.' 4 Tenant damage actions designed to deter code
violations, it is argued, are unnecessary or even counterproductive to
the extent that state law assigns discretionary enforcement of the
housing codes to public officials. I85 In determining whether state law
threatens the health or safety of the occupants of the leased premises. If necessary, it can be
said that such an intentional breach is outrageous as a matter of law.
Likewise, liability for noneconomic damages, if cognizable at all, should not be limited to
"severe" emotional distress, as is often the case for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Any harm should be recoverable. It does not make sense to deny a damage action for
distress that is substantial, but fails to rise to the level of the factfinder's conception of sever-
ity. Moreover, if deterrence of landlords' noncompliance with habitability is the justification
for noneconomic damage, then for deterrence to be effective damages must be imposed
generally in run-of-the-mill cases, not just in exceptional cases.
The cases to date that have imposed tort liability on landlords for breach of habitability
generally have required that the landlord acted outrageously, or that the harm was severe. See
supra text accompanying notes 103-77. The nuisance approach in Stoiber, however, effectively
eliminates these roadblocks. See supra text accompanying notes 107-16.
General trends in tort law also support widespread landlord liability for noneconomic in-
juries to tenants. During the past decades, courts have greatly expanded the recovery of
damages for psychic injuries. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional A t-
tacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195, 217-18 (1985).
183. See, e.g., Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959).
Such considerations have led some state legislatures to limit noneconomic damages to a max-
imum dollar amount in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
Supp. 1986) ($250,000 limit). That limit was upheld against constitutional attack in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 214 (1985). For discussion of constitutional issues involved in statutory reform of
medical malpractice liability, see Smith, supra note 182.
184. In a number of jurisdictions habitability is defined as a warranty that the dwelling
unit complies with the housing code. In that type of jurisdiction, all habitability defects violate
the housing code. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
185. The argument here parallels the justification for prosecutorial discretion in criminal
law. Discretion on the part of housing officials is desirable, if under some set of cir-
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should sanction noneconomic damages, a court should assess the
nature and extent of the role of public officials in ameliorating
substandard housing. If it is determined that the official role is suffi-
ciently extensive so that private deterrence is unnecessary or
undesirable, then noneconomic damages should not be recognized.
In the past, a few courts have faced the same issue-resolving the
role of tenants vis-a-vis public officials in housing code en-
forcement-when deciding whether tenants had any rights at all
under the codes. Javins permitted rental abatement based on code
violations, rejecting the argument that this right would unduly in-
terfere with official functioning. '186 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion in a later case, finding that state law
envisioned discretionary code enforcement in an administrative
forum by the housing commissioner, with no room for tenant en-
forcement in the courts.I87 The issue here is different than in Javins,
and a line could be drawn between rental abatement and
noneconomic damages. In a jurisdiction following Javins, the issue
is, given that the housing code impliedly grants the tenant a right to
rental abatement, would the further remedy of noneconomic
damages improperly interfere with the official role in code enforce-
ment? Possibly a tenant right to abate rent or terminate a lease is
compatible with the official role, but the assessment of noneconomic
damages would interfere with the discretionary levying of civil or
criminal fines for code violations.
The second major justification for noneconomic damages is
distinct from deterrence and invokes considerations of tenant worth-
iness and landlord fault. Tenants who suffer because of housing
defects, especially when they rise to the level of slum-like conditions,
may deserve compensation. Concomitantly, there is outrage at
landlords who callously and repeatedly refuse to make needed, leg-
ally required repairs.' 8 This argument has a moral tone to it and at
bottom is essentially redistributional. One can accept the proposition
that low-income tenants, as a class, deserve better housing. The
question then becomes who pays for it, for the tenants cannot. The
problem is inseparable from that of poverty generally; the poor can-
not afford to pay the minimum rent required for the production of
standard housing. The next argument sometimes made in support of
redistribution is that slum landlords, because of their history of op-
cumstances, rigorous code enforcement would not benefit the community. Arguably, failure
to enforce the code is justified in a neighborhood where enforcement would result not in com-
pliance, but in widespread abandonment by landlords of their properties.
186. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080-82.
187. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
188. See, e.g., Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967).
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pression and disregard for the human rights of tenants, should bear
all or the lion's share of the economic burden of eliminating substan-
dard housing. II9 Arrival at this point, however, does not support the
recognition of noneconomic damages on a widespread basis. If such
redistribution is desirable, it should not be done by the courts
through awards for noneconomic damages or any other type of
damages. Due to the ad hoc nature of litigation, only some landlords
would pay and only some low-income tenants would receive benefits.
Moreover, even if a flood of tenant litigation resulted in widespread
transfers, the cost of handling this judicially would be far too ineffi-
cient. If it is determined that tenants have a right to standard hous-
ing, regardless of their income level, the necessary redistribution
should be funded through taxation, whether the tax is levied upon
some defined group of "slumlords," or residential landlords as a
whole, or some larger segment of society. On the delivery side, a
number of options would be available, such as public housing pro-
grams, cash payments to tenants, or subsidized rents through
governmental payments to landlords. 9 '
B. Contract Damages
The first cases defining the term "habitability" emphasized the
nonwaivable, health and safety related, housing defects described
above. In many jurisdictions at the present time, such a definition
fully defines the contours of habitability.' 9 I However, a more expan-
sive view of habitability has gained some recognition. The scope of
habitability varies among jurisdictions, and some states define
habitability broadly enough to include elements of the parties'
bargain in fact.'92 For example, consider a lease of an air condi-
tioned house, with no lease covenant addressing repairs to the air
conditioning. In a jurisdiction that defines habitability by reference
to community standards, in addition to or in lieu of a housing code,
habitability may require that the landlord repair air conditioning if it
ceases to function during the term of the lease. This defect is
waivable, as the landlord and tenant could have expressly agreed that
the landlord would not be responsible for air conditioning repairs.
All that habitability does in this context is to add an implied cove-
nant to the lease, assigning the repair duty to the landlord, when the
189. Id. at 874-75.
190. See F. DELEEUW, S. LEAMAN& H. BLANK, DESIGN OF A HOUSING ALLOWANCE (1970).
191. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
192. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, l0 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974).
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parties were silent. This use of habitability reverses the common-law
rules of caveat emptor and waste, which allocated the responsibility
to the tenant. The rationale for using habitability in this fashion is
based on classic contract principles. Provisions that the parties
would have expressly stated, had they thought about the matter
when the lease was made, are impliedly included in the contract. The
implication is based upon contemporary standards and practices in
the community. Landlords, rather than tenants, usually repair air
conditioners when the need arises.
Habitability claims based upon waivable defects, such as the one
described above, differ substantially from nonwaivable habitability
claims. They originate in the parties' implied bargain in fact. In con-
trast, the nonwaivable habitability duties are imposed by law as a
matter of public policy to safeguard the health and safety of tenants
and others who may enter the premises. Given the different legal
underpinnings of these two species of habitability claims, it is not
surprising that each should have its own remedial strategy. The
public and private interests to be protected are dissimilar, and the at-
tempt to treat both using contract principles is too confining. A
bifurcation of habitability into the realms of tort and contract offers
the promise of developing a coherent remedial framework for each
class of cases.
A habitability action for damages based upon the landlord's
failure to repair the air conditioning in a timely fashion is contrac-
tual. The proper measure of damages gives the tenant the benefit of
his bargain by awarding the fair rental value of the premises (with air
conditioning), less their value hot and steamy, for the duration of
the breach. This is the appropriate measure of damages because it
treats a covenant implied under the habitability doctrine in the same
manner as an express covenant covering the same topic. The same
measure of damages would apply had the landlord expressly prom-
ised to repair the air conditioning, and then defaulted.' 93
C. Election of Tort or Contract
The division of habitability into tort and contract has implications
for the election of remedies. The basic issue is whether a tenant
generally should have the option of treating a breach of the duty of
habitability either as a contract breach or as a tort. Presently, the
evolving case law indicates that there will be a substantial overlap;
193. See, e.g., Noble v. Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949); Zion Indus.,
Inc. v. Loy, 46 III. App. 3d 902, 361 N.E.2d 605 (1977); see also Bradley v. Godwin, 152 Ga.
App. 782, 264 S.E.2d 262 (1979) (using as the measure of damages the difference between the
agreed rent and the rental value of the premises in an unrepaired state).
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breach of contract will always lie, and a tort action exists if the
elements for that particular tort are also met.' 94 Of course, a tenant
having multiple causes of action in tort and contract based on the
same defect is limited to one satisfaction for his injury.'9
The overlap between tort and contract, with the potential for elec-
tion, is largely eliminated by dividing habitability into tort and con-
tract. If this division is made, the existence of a nonwaivable defect
generally will constitute a tort, but not a breach of contract. With
that division, a problem will arise when an express covenant covers a
nonwaivable defect. Should an election between contract and tort be
allowed when the landlord has breached the duty to repair a non-
waivable defect that he has also expressly covenanted to repair? For
example, in the lease the landlord might covenant to maintain the
plumbing in good, functioning condition. Failure to do so would
breach that covenant and violate a nonwaivable habitability duty as
well, by materially affecting the tenant's health and safety.
Arguably, in this situation the tenant should have the choice between
suing on the express covenant, which presumably was bargained for,
and suing in tort. On the other hand, under the remedial proposals
made in this article, the choice really serves no useful purpose and
could be eliminated, if for no other reason than for the sake of con-
ceptual neatness. The tenant who received the plumbing covenant
obviously deserves compensatory damages, but even if he is limited
to tort damages, the tenant will collect compensatory damages for
injury to his property interest, based upon its diminution in value. In
this connection, perhaps the express covenant can serve as some
evidence that the tenant has incurred actual economic injury.
Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, it is questionable
whether the tenant in fact did bargain for the plumbing covenant,
because no other agreement on that topic was legally permissible.
The express covenant can be viewed not as a right that was in-
dependently bargained for, but as a reminder that the lease is subject
to governing law. Why should a tenant who has obtained a covenant
that merely states existing, nonwaivable law be in a better position
with respect to remedial choices than a tenant who decides not to ob-
tain a written covenant that would be superfluous?
A second problem with allowing the tenant to elect between tort
and contract remedies is the converse of the situation described
above. Can the landlord's breach of an express covenant relating to
a waivable defect also be tortious? For example, with respect to the
air conditioning covenant described above, when, if ever, should the
194. See supra text accompanying notes 103-77.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 150.
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landlord's deliberate refusal to repair be a tort as well as a breach of
contract? Should it be a tortious wrong if, when a heat wave hits, an
elderly tenant is threatened by heat stroke, and the landlord still
neglects to repair, even after notice of these facts? Again, present
case law in a few jurisdictions suggests that such a tenant can elect to
sue in tort. However, it is not clear that such an election is necessary
for the adequate protection of tenants. Whatever legitimately could
be recovered in a tort action might just as readily be compensable in
a contract action as consequential damages and punitive damages.
D. Other Remedies
While the principal remedial consequence of bifurcating
habitability into tort and contract is in the analysis of damages, there
are ramifications for some of the other tenant remedies. Other te-
nant remedies that have been recognized include termination of the
lease, specific performance, and repair-and-deduct. For each
remedy, the pertinent question is to what extent the shift from a con-
tract to a tort conception changes the nature and availability of the
remedy. How these remedies are presently handled, and should be
handled, under contract law is discussed above.' 96 This section
analyzes the treatment of these tenant remedies from the perspective
of tort law.
Termination of the lease for the landlord's breach of the duty of
habitability is presently conceived of as a contract right that is
available provided that the breach is material. There is no reason
why the tenant right to terminate should change if the breach of a
nonwaivable habitability duty is recast as a tort. Conceptually, term-
ination is then justified not because of a material default, but
because of the landlord's material injury to the tenant's property.
The law of bailments provides support for this result. In jurisdictions
that view bailment as a property doctrine, rather than a contractual
relationship, injury to the bailed property justifies the bailee's term-
ination of the bailment.' 97
Under contract law specific performance of the landlord's
habitability duties may be limited by the requirement that damages
196. See supra text accompanying notes 61-96.
197. The analogy applies when the bailment is to continue for a definite period of time and
the injury to the bailed property is not due to the bailee's lack of due care. The bailee may
want to return the bailed goods to avoid payment of the agreed rental. This type of bailment is
often referred to as a lease of personal property. See Fuchs v. Coe, 62 Wyo. 134, 171-72, 163
P.2d 783, 797 (1945). See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS §§
417, 417a (8th ed. 1870); 9 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1034, at 887. Williston defines bail-
ment in terms of property rather than contract as "the rightful possession of goods by one
who is not the owner." Id. § 1030, at 875.
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would provide inadequate relief.198 Under tort law the question
would become, should the court enjoin an activity (the landlord's
refusal to repair) that constitutes a continuing tort? Traditional prin-
ciples of equity would permit great flexibility here. The court .could
borrow the contract-law limitation on specific performance, or al-
ternatively grant injunctive relief on a more liberal basis. Analogies
can be made to the practice of enjoining nuisances and continuing
trespasses to property. 99
Repair-and-deduct is sui generis as a tenant remedy."' It is not a
traditional contract-law remedy, and some courts have denied it to
tenants on that basis. Nor is repair-and-deduct part and parcel of
hornbook tort law, but tort principles provide some limited support
for this remedy. Ample authority exists than an owner of property is
privileged to take measures that prevent the commission of a tort
with respect to his property. 01 If breach of habitability is a tort, then
the tenant who repairs is exercising this privilege-the repair abates
the continuing tort. Under repair-and-deduct, however, the tenant
then takes the next step of charging the tortfeasor with the costs of
abatement by an offset to rent. While nothing in tort law at the pre-
sent time authorizes the rent deduction, if the need for tenant action
to repair is seen as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the tor-
tious conduct, then it could be encompassed as an element of
economic damage. If the tenant's repair costs would be recoverable
in a tort action brought against the landlord, and alternatively would
be allowed as a counterclaim if the landlord brought an action for
unpaid rent, then plainly the tenant should be permitted to deduct
the costs from the rent. Modern landlord-tenant law has cast aside
the ancient dogma that the respective duties of the landlord and te-
nant are independent. 2 If the landlord sues for rent or for posses-
sion and the tenant establishes that the tort counterclaim is
meritorious, then the tenant should not be deemed to have breached
the lease.
VI. CONCLUSION
After more than a decade of judicial and legislative innovation,
the duty of a residential landlord to provide habitable premises is
firmly entrenched as a part of American law. Presently, the relevant
198. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
199. See 6-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 28.17 (trespass), 28.35 (nuisance) (1952).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
201. See W. PROSSER& W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS §§ 21, 89 (5th ed. 1984). The privileges
include the right to prevent or terminate a trespass to land and the right to abate a continuing
nuisance by self-help.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
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debate focuses on the contours of the duty and the choice of
remedies available to the aggrieved tenant. Yet in the process of
reforming the law, a wrong step was taken. To escape the shackles of
the ancient pro-landlord dogma of caveat emptor, the courts turned
to contract law as the fountainhead for the habitability duty. Con-
tract, however, has nothing to do with habitability when, as a matter
of public policy, all leased dwelling units must comply with
minimum standards relating to safety and the provision of essential
services. Tort law should be recognized as the basis for this type of
habitability duty.
Recognition that a landlord's breach of a nonwaivable obligation
to provide habitable premises is a tort leads to better analysis of
remedies. Freed from the need to resort to a fictitious bargain, where
none in fact exists, courts can award or deny damages for economic
loss by measuring the diminution in value of the tenant's leasehold.
When a tenant claims noneconomic damages in the nature of emo-
tional distress or pain and suffering, judicial recognition of such an
action should depend upon the need within the jurisdiction to deter
landlords' intentional evasion of their habitability duties. When that
need is great and is not being alleviated by other mechanisms such as
vigorous housing code enforcement by public officials, it is proper
for courts to expand landlord liability to encompass noneconomic
damage. Although there can be no guarantee that the added poten-
tial liability will cause all or even most landlords to comply, it makes
compliance more likely by forcing landlords to recalculate the cost of
violating habitability standards.
Grounding the concept of habitability in tort law does not wholly
remove contract from the picture because a number of jurisdictions
recognize, as an element of habitability, a landlord's duty to main-
tain the premises in accordance with community standards. That
duty, when it may legally be modified by an express agreement bet-
ween landlord and tenant, is based upon an implied bargain in fact.
This type of habitability should remain the province of contract law
and should be recognized as separate and distinct from the tort ac-
tion described above.
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